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INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, the French Parliament passed a statute meant to bring
domestic law into conformity with several European legal instruments recently adopted. The statute explicitly addressed for the first time contem*
Grotius Research Scholar, University of Michigan Law School 2015, Bénédicte
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slavery issues. This paper combines the key components of the Author’s presentations
delivered at the workshops: “Legislating and Litigating in the Campaign Against Modern
Slavery: Theory Meets Practice” (University of Michigan Law School, December 2014) and
“New developments in the Campaigns against Contemporary Slavery: Strategies for
Legislation, Litigation and Research” (University of Michigan Law School, October 2015), to
which some further developments have been added, inter alia for updating purposes. The
Author would like to thank Leonardo Barbosa and Vladislava Stoyanova for sharing their
work and analysis, which substantially fed the reflection exposed hereafter. This paper would
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of the Michigan Journal of International Law for their assistance and editing. All opinions
and any errors in the paper remain the responsibility of the Author.
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porary forms of slavery, servitude, and forced labor by establishing a set of
four offenses that criminalize these three types of severe labor exploitation. For lawmakers as well as for many stakeholders in the fight against
modern-day slavery, that achievement marked the culmination of a series
of piecemeal amendments to criminal law and narrow advances in case
law, which gradually enhanced the penal repression of modern-day slavery
over the previous decade. This paper demonstrates that, even though the
new penal provisions constitute a turning point in the criminal approach to
contemporary forms of slavery, the 2013 statute only represents a milestone amid an ongoing process aimed at defining the concepts of slavery,
servitude and forced labor. To that end, this essay puts into perspective the
defining elements identified under human rights law by the European
Court of Human Rights and the elements of the crimes established within
the French penal law. It brings out the gaps and inconsistencies that affect
the existing European definitions and are likely to impede the efficiency of
the new national penal tools. The first section lays out the criminal provisions initially used by French judicial authorities for the repression of contemporary slavery, as well as the causes of their inadequacy. The second
section of this article analyzes the legal framework drawn by the European
Court of Human Rights as to the prohibition of severe forms of labor exploitation and identifies the features of European Human Rights Law that
might hinder the conversion of its definitional standards into domestic
criminal offenses. Finally, the third section thoroughly explores the constituent elements of the four newly-adopted crimes and seeks to appraise
their ability to efficiently capture this phenomenon. By doing so, it brings
to light the theoretical misconceptions that garble the current legal definitions of slavery, servitude and forced labor.
I. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE CONCEPT OF WORKING AND LIVING
CONDITIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY
The phenomenon of modern-day slavery in France has received the
attention of public authorities only in relatively recent times. While the
first cases appeared during the 1990s, they started to be referred to criminal courts only toward the end of that decade. At that time, judicial authorities generally addressed them under the purview of two existing
provisions in the penal code, one of which deals with the imposition of
unpaid labor on vulnerable or dependent workers, and the other of which
addresses the subjection of vulnerable or dependent persons to working or
living conditions that are incompatible with human dignity.1
These two offenses read:
1.
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 225-13 to 14 (Fr.) (These offenses are
still in force, but have been amended through several changes in the wording since then. The
different versions amended over the years are available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/af
fichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&idArticle=LEGIARTI0000213429
65).
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Art. 225-13 - Le fait d’obtenir d’une personne, en abusant de sa
vulnérabilité ou de sa situation de dépendance, la fourniture de
services non rétribués ou en échange d’une rétribution manifestement sans rapport avec l’importance du travail accompli est puni
de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 500 000 F d’amende.2 (“It
shall be an offence punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a
fine of 500,000 francs to obtain from an individual the performance of services without payment or in exchange for payment that
is manifestly disproportionate to the amount of work carried out,
by taking advantage of that person’s vulnerability or state of
dependence.”)
Art. 225-14 - Le fait de soumettre une personne, en abusant de sa
vulnérabilité ou de sa situation de dépendance, à des conditions
de travail ou d’hébergement incompatibles avec la dignité
humaine est puni de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 500 000 F
d’amende.3 (“It shall be an offence punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 francs to subject an individual to
working or living conditions which are incompatible with human
dignity by taking advantage of that individual’s vulnerability or
state of dependence.”)
Over the next decade and beyond, the sole criminal framework through
which severe forms of labor exploitation were punished has consisted of
these two provisions. While the inherent quality of the offenses was challenged by some lawmakers,4 which prompted several amendments,5 the
approach enshrined in the provisions was not questioned as such within
law-making bodies. At first glance, indeed, the combination of the two
offenses might be seen to provide a comprehensive and well-suited scheme
to ensure the prohibition of all contemporary slavery-related practices: the
absence of or clearly inadequate payment for work characterizes an objective exploitation of a workforce, while outrageous working or living conditions embody the contempt for human dignity which is peculiar to slavery.
Thus, the legal response to modern-day slavery was achieved through the
penalization of the main common features that flag severe exploitative
practices, and therefore distinguishing between and defining the different
types of labor exploitation could appear to be unnecessary. However, the
two offenses, which were passed as part of the new penal code in 1994,
were not designed to target contemporary forms of slavery, strictly speaking. Rather, from the parliamentary debates it appears that:
2.

Id. art. 225–13 (In the wording in force from Mar. 1, 1994 to Jan. 1, 2002).

3.

Id. art. 225–14 (In the wording in force from Mar. 1, 1994 to Jan. 1, 2002).

4.

See, e.g., Alain Vidalies, Rapport d’Information no. 3459, 55–57, ASSEMBLÉE NA(2001), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/legislatures/11/pdf/rap-info/i3459.pdf; see
also Christine Lazerges, Rapport no. 3552, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE (2002), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/rapports/r3552.asp.
TIONALE

5.

C. PÉN art. 225–13 (In the wording in force from Mar. 1, 1994 to Jan. 1, 2002).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\38-3\MIL303.txt

458

unknown

Seq: 4

Michigan Journal of International Law

6-APR-18

9:19

[Vol. 38:455

[. . .] the legislature’s intention was to protect the most vulnerable
persons against various forms of exploitation, without broadening
and trivializing prosecutions to the point of penalizing, through
this means, all the conduct contrary to labor law regulations or to
housing, building and town-planning regulations, even in the case
when imbalanced contractual relations are at stake. (“[. . .] la
volonté du législateur a été de protéger les personnes les plus
vulnérables contre les diverses formes d’exploitation, sans élargir
et banaliser les poursuites au point de pénaliser, par ce biais, tous
les comportements contraires à la réglementation du travail ou
aux règles d’habitation, de construction et d’urbanisme, quand
bien même seraient en cause des relations contractuelles
déséquilibrées.”)6
It can thus be discerned that the offenses were aimed at covering a wider
spectrum of exploitative practices beyond mere slavery-like situations. At
the same time, the constituent elements of the two crimes trace a gravity
threshold across all the targeted exploitative conduct, which acts as the
trigger point of penal law:7 for penal sanctions8 to apply, work in particular must be “performed under circumstances that are incompatible with
human dignity” (“accompli dans des conditions contraires à la dignité
humaine”)9 or “inherently incompatible with such a dignity” (“instrinsèquement contraire à cette dignité”).10
This has significantly swayed the way judges have construed the penal
prohibition of severe forms of exploitation,11 and ultimately their understanding of human exploitation dynamics. Since the exploitative conduct
encompassed in the provisions is not restricted to modern-day forms of
slavery, neither the title nor the definition of the offenses explicitly refers
to any of the latter. This results in a disconnection of domestic measures
from the various international instruments dedicated to some or any types
of slavery-related practices,12 which is especially important in the defining
6.
SYLVIE MÉNOTTI, Conditions de travail et d’hébergement contraires à la dignité
humaine, J-CL. PÉNAL, Fasc. 20 (2010) (discussing the Penal Code provisions of art. 225-13,
225-16, ¶ 6).
7.
It is worth specifying that the two offenses are gathered in the section of the penal
code, C. PÉN. Sec. 3, which is titled “On working and living conditions which are incompatible with human dignity” (“Des conditions de travail et d’hébergement contraires à la dignité
humaine”).
8.
The issue addressed here also engages with the question of moral judgments expressed through the labeling of crimes and their impact on the punishment. See infra II–A,
pp. 464–65.
9.
MÉNOTTI, supra note 6, ¶ 68.
10.
Id.
11.
See COMMISSION NATIONALE CONSULTATIVE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, La traite et
l’exploitation des êtres humains en France 76–78 (La Documentation Française 2010), http://
www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/etude_traite_et_exploitation_des_etres_humains_en_france
.pdf.
12.
In particular: the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (“the
Slavery Convention”), signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 and entered into force on 9
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process undertaken by judges. As the offenses do not strictly and directly
govern modern-day forms of slavery, but rather deal with specific conditions surrounding a larger array of exploitative behaviors among human
beings, international law relating to slavery-like practices or forced labor
becomes irrelevant to the judicial definition of the elements of the crime,
including the determination of the gravity threshold, which rests on an
autonomous concept of human dignity.
The latter concept has been substantiated by judges chiefly in light of
the guidelines provided by the parliamentary debates. Relying on the underlying tenet according to which “[. . .] what is incompatible with human
dignity is what abases or demeans the human person by tending towards
the reification of his/her body or by infringing on the fundamental rights of
his/her person” (“[. . .] est incompatible avec la dignité humaine, ce qui
abaisse ou avilit l’être humain en tendant à la reification de son corps ou
en portant atteinte aux droits essentiels de sa peronnalité”),13 judges on
the whole have delineated a highly stringent standard to be reached for
exploitative practices to fall into the ambit of penal law. In substance,
working or living conditions incompatible with human dignity sanction
breaches of labor or housing regulations whose accumulation and scale
indicate “[. . .] not only a disregard for law, but a genuine disdain for the
rights of the person, testifying to the subjection of the latter to a means of
production” (“[. . .] non pas seulement une indifférence à la loi, mais un
veritable mépris des droits de la personne [. . .] témoignant de son asservissement en tant qu’objet de production”).14 In sum, the jurisprudence rendered under these two provisions shows that the notion of “human
dignity” has ultimately directed judges towards a search for dramatic and
impressive situations, in which the impact of exploitation on workers’
physical and moral integrity is only incidentally taken into consideration.
In such a context, the emergence of cases involving slavery-like practices within the domestic sphere has crucially called into question the statutory and judicial grasp of modern-day slavery, bringing a different
perspective into the actuality of severe exploitative situations. These cases
concern predominantly migrant domestic workers who were forced into
slavery-like conditions in the households of their employers.15 The specific
March 1927, which was amended by a Protocol of 7 December 1953, entered into force on 7
July 1955; The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries
convened by Economic and Social Council resolution 608 (XXI) of 30 April 1956, which was
done at Geneva on 7 September 1956 and entered into force on 30 April 1957; The International Labor Organization [ILO] Convention No. 29 adopted in Geneva on 28 June 1930, and
entered into force on 1 May 1932 (A Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention was adopted
in Geneva on 11 June 2014, and entered into force on 9 November 2016); The 1957 ILO
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), adopted in Geneva on 25
June 1957, and entered into force on 17 January 1959; This list is not exhaustive.
13.

MÉNOTTI, supra note 6, ¶ 64.

14.

MÉNOTTI, supra note 6, ¶ 70.

15.
Domestic worker is to be understood here within the meaning of the ILO Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (No. 189) art. 1(a)–(b) (entered into
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features of this type of labor exploitation, as well as the particular profiles
of these exploiters, underscored these penal provisions’ shortfalls, and
contributed to bringing to light the misconception that undermined the
initial approach adopted by judicial authorities.
The first landmark case to raise the issue of the French criminal legislation’s inadequacy with respect to sanctioning all forms of modern-day
slavery was initiated by Ms. Siwa-Akofa Siliadin, a fifteen year old
Togolese national who had been exploited in domestic work for four years
upon her arrival in France. The circumstances of the case can be summarized as follows16: Ms. Siliadin was brought to France by a French national
of Togolese origin, following an agreement with her parents. According to
the agreement, she would work at that person’s home until the cost of her
air ticket had been reimbursed, while her host would take care of her immigration status and send her to school. In reality, the applicant became
an unpaid housemaid, first for her host family, and then for another family
to whom she had been “lent.” Her passport was taken from her. She
worked seven days a week from 7:30 A.M. to about 10:30 P.M. Her tasks
included preparing breakfast, dressing her employers’ four children, taking
them to nursery school or their recreational activities, looking after the
baby, doing the housework, washing and ironing clothes, preparing dinner,
looking after the older children and washing up. In addition, she had to
clean a studio flat that belonged to her employers in the same building.
She wore second-hand clothes and slept on a mattress on the floor in the
baby’s room, so she could look after him during the night. Her immigration status was never taken care of, and she did not attend school. She
eventually managed to alert a neighbor of her situation, and after the police raided the place, she filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office.
Unsurprisingly, her employers were prosecuted on charges of “having
obtained the performance of services without payment or in exchange for
payment that was manifestly disproportionate to the work carried out, by
taking advantage of that person’s vulnerability or state of dependence,” as
well as of “having subjected an individual to working and living conditions
that were incompatible with human dignity by taking advantage of her
vulnerability or state of dependence.”17 However, the criminal proceedings at the end of a series of appeals, one of which reached the Cour de
Cassation (the French Supreme Court),18 resulted in the final acquittal of

force Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::
P12100_ILO_CODE:C189. Art. 1(a)–(b) reads: “(a) the term domestic work means work
performed in or for a household or households,” and “(b) the term domestic worker means
any person engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship.”.
16.
For a comprehensive statement of the facts, see Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/
01, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 10–18.
17.
18.
21–45.

Id. ¶ 20.
For a detailed overview of the entirety of the domestic proceedings, see Id. ¶¶
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Ms. Siliadin’s employers.19 It is worth mentioning that, despite some conflicting judicial analysis and three judgments partly rendered in favor of
Ms. Siliadin, trial and appeal courts unanimously came to find that the
plaintiff was not subjected to working or living conditions that were incompatible with human dignity. The Versailles Court of Appeal in particular, which issued the final judgment in that case at the domestic level,
substantiated its decision as follows:
As the court of first instance correctly noted, carrying out household tasks and looking after children throughout the day could not
by themselves constitute working conditions incompatible with
human dignity, this being the lot of many mothers; in addition, the
civil party’s allegations of humiliating treatment or harassment
have not been proved. Equally, the fact that [Ms. Siliadin] did not
have an area reserved for her personal use does not mean that the
accommodation was incompatible with human dignity, given that
[the perpetrators’] own children shared the same room, which was
in no way unhygienic. Accordingly, the constituent elements of
this second offence have not been established in respect to [the
perpetrators]. (“Comme l’ont justement relevé les premiers juges,
le fait de s’occuper des tâches ménagères et des enfants pendant la
totalité de la journée, ne saurait constituer à lui seul des conditions de travail incompatibles avec la dignité humaine, ce sort
étant celui de nombreuses mères de famille ; la preuve
d’humiliations ou de vexations qu’aurait subies la partie civile
n’est pas rapportée par ailleurs ; De même, le fait de ne pas avoir
réservé un espace personnel à [Mme Siliadin] ne caractérise pas
un hébergement contraire à la dignité humaine dès lors que les
propres enfants [des employeurs] partageaient la même chambre,
laquelle ne présentait aucun caractère d’insalubrité ; Les éléments
constitutifs de ce second délit ne sont donc pas réunis à l’encontre
des [employeurs].”)20
This makes plain that, in such cases where the exploited person performs
domestic work and is required to live in the exploiters’ households, even
though the exploitative treatment to which he or she is subjected may
amount to a slavery-like practice, it is not outlawed since the physical conditions in which the exploitation occurs do not in themselves infringe upon
human dignity.
As the existing domestic legislation prevented her from obtaining justice, Ms. Siliadin referred her case to the European Court of Human
Rights, thereby initiating an enduring and tricky dialogue between Euro-

19.
The final acquittal was actually due to both the analysis on the merits and the
application of some procedural rules.
20.
Versailles Court of Appeal’s judgment, issued 15 May 2003, as quoted in Siliadin,
2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 44.
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pean and French national authorities, which would eventually lead to the
enactment of the 2013 statute.
II. THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK SET OUT
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

BY

THE EUROPEAN

Before discussing in detail the criminal provisions adopted by the
French Parliament in 2013, this section aims to specify the requirements
imposed by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)21on
contracting states as to the prohibition of severe forms of labor exploitation, which affects criminal definitional issues.
The legal system of the ECHR provides for supranational judicial review over states, which is exercised through specific litigation. This is carried out by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which at the
same time is in charge of the interpretation of the Convention.22 Thus,
“[. . .] the Strasbourg Court not only seeks to settle the particular cases
that are submitted to it, but also to elaborate a European human rights
law.” (“[. . .] la Cour cherche non seulement à régler les affaires particulières qui lui sont soumises mais aussi à élaborer un droit européen des
droits de l’homme.”).23
A.

Issues At Stake in the Siliadin Case

The Siliadin case was the first case involving a modern-day form of
slavery ever submitted to the Court under Article 4 of the Convention.
ECHR Article 4 is divided into three paragraphs, the first two of which
provide, respectively, that “[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude”
and that “[n]o one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.” Thus, three distinctive types of exploitation are addressed in the
Convention: slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labor.
As to the litigation brought before the Court, a first dispute arose between the applicant and the defending state regarding the classification of
the facts (the facts were not themselves challenged as such). The applicant
deemed that the exploitation to which she had been subjected to constituted a situation of servitude, while the state argued that the factual circumstances of the case described forced labor within the meaning of the
Convention, and that the imposition of the payment of damages had accorded sufficient redress.24 Yet the set of obligations upon states that flow
from Article 4 do not differ depending on the classification of the factual
circumstances into one of the three concepts contained in the provision,
21.
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter ECHR], opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 005 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953).
22.
Id. art. 32(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning
the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols [. . .]”).
23.
MARINA EUDES, La Pratique Judiciaire Interne de la Cour Européenne des Droits
de l’Homme, 252 (A. Pedone ed. 2005).
24.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 92, 106.
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and the control of their compliance is triggered as soon as Article 4 is
found applicable. In the instant case, the conduct of the perpetrators, irrespective of how it was termed, had remained unpunished at the end of the
national criminal proceedings. Therefore, as the stance adopted by the
French state regarding the qualification could have only a symbolic impact
without any substantial effect on the outcome of the case, it can be considered as reflecting the interpretation of the state regarding the concrete
situations to which the concepts of servitude and forced labor refer. However, the Court ruled in favor of the position defended by the complainant,
stating that:
Sight should not be lost of the Convention’s special features or of
the fact that it is a living instrument which must be interpreted in
the light of present-day conditions, and that the increasingly high
standard being required in the area of the protection of human
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably
requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental
values of democratic societies [. . .].25
In this way, in order to determine and impose the European standard
of servitude on states, the Court applies here a widely-used method, relying on the “fundamental values of democratic societies.” This approach is
favored in that, “[. . .] rather than to cause concern to states” (“[. . .], plutôt
que d’inquiéter les Etats”)26, it ensures that “[. . .] all of [the European]
standards advantageously and legitimately contribute to the construction
of a common European law, and that they do not result from the willingness of judges who would abusively seek to impose to states some role
models chosen at their own discretion.” (“[. . .] tous ces standards participent utilement et légitimement de la construction d’un droit européen
commun, et qu’ils ne résultent pas de la volonté du juge qui chercherait
abusivement à imposer aux Etats parties des modèles de comportements
discrétionnairement choisis.”).27 However, by referring at the same time
to the increasingly high standard required, which warrants a greater firmness in the assessment of the breaches of these values, the Court also introduces a changing set of definitions. Within the European legal
framework, defining exploitation-related concepts is a dynamic process,
and the identification of the behaviors covered by the notions of slavery,
servitude or forced labor is contingent upon the level of exigency with
which the assessment is conducted.28
In addressing the core claim and the alleged violation of Article 4, the
Court first agreed with the applicant29 as to the existence of an obligation,
25.

Id. ¶ 121.

26.

Eudes, supra note 23, at 436.

27.

Id. at 437.

28.

See also infra II–B pp. 467.

29.
The defending state primarily argued that “the proceedings before the criminal
courts which led to the payment of damages were sufficient under Article 4 in order to com-
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under Article 4 of the Convention, for member states to penalize and effectively prosecute “any act aimed at maintaining a person in such a situation.”30 Then it assessed both the offenses of taking advantage of a
person’s vulnerability or dependent state to obtain services without payment or any adequate payment and of subjecting such a person to working
or living conditions incompatible with human dignity. The Court found
that these criminal provisions failed to meet the above obligation, emphasizing in particular that they “do not deal specifically with the rights guaranteed under Article 4 of the Convention, but concern, in a much more
restrictive way, exploitation through labor and subjection to working and
living conditions that are incompatible with human dignity.”31 In other
words, the European judges were critical of the tangible difference in the
respective scopes of the exploitative practices prohibited by the ECHR
and the corresponding domestic offenses. Hence, the Court pointed to the
key obstacle to making criminal provisions an effective tool in the repression of severe forms of labor exploitation: their failure to target contemporary slavery as such and thereby to focus on the very essence of the
phenomenon through the constituent elements of the offenses.32
This crucial facet of the European stance on the prohibition of modern-day slavery implicitly brings to light that what is traditionally considered from the perspective of the rights of the defense, through the
principle of “fair labeling,” may also constitute a major guarantee for the
effectiveness of the victim’s right “to see those responsible for the wrongdoing convicted under the criminal law.”33 In light of the protection of the
rights of defense, “[t]he principle of ‘fair labeling’ requires that the label of
the offense should fairly express and signal the wrongdoing of the accused,
so that the stigma of conviction corresponds to the wrongfulness of the act.
Labeling reflects the moral judgments that the public makes about the relevant conduct.”34 From the view of effective protection of victims of exploitative abuses by domestic criminal law, however, the label of the
crime, by bringing about the constituent elements of the offense, is also
meant to provide judges with clear guidance as to the corresponding conduct, enabling them to identify in a classification the case they have to
ply with any positive obligation arising from the Convention.” Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.
R., ¶¶ 69, 75.
30.

Id. ¶ 112.

31.

Id. ¶ 142.

32.
This line of reasoning has been confirmed and reinforced by the Court in its subsequent case-law, in particular C.N. v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08, 2012-XI Eur.
Ct. H.R. . For a review of the latter case, see VLADISLAVA STOYANOVA, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY RECONSIDERED: CONCEPTUAL LIMITS AND STATES’ POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW, 245 (2017).
33.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 145.

34.
Vladislava Stoyanova, Article 4 of the ECHR and the Obligation of Criminalising
Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. OF INT’L AND
COMP. LAW, 427, 427–28 (2014), https://works.bepress.com/vladislava_stoyanova/9/.
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decide.35 Hence, both the capacity of judges to acknowledge the accurate
seriousness of severe forms of exploitation, and a sentencing that reflects
the moral judgments of a given society towards these conducts depend on
the penal labeling of modern-day situations of slavery. The French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights does bring this linkage
out when, commenting on the quantum of the sentences imposed on perpetrators of modern-day slavery who were found guilty under Article 22513 and Article 225-14 of the French penal code, it noted that “nothing says
to judges through the wording of these offenses that they face a serious
conduct which not only breaches the standards of labor and housing, but
also can constitute a forced labor, a form of servitude or slavery as condemned by international law. What is not named forced labor, servitude or
slavery cannot be sentenced as such.” (“rien ne vient rappeler au juge dans
l’énoncé de ces infractions qu’il fait face à un comportement grave violant
non seulement les standards du travail ou de l’hébergement, mais pouvant
aussi constituer un travail forcé, une forme de servitude ou d’esclavage tels
que condamnés par le droit international. Ce qui n’est pas nommé travail
forcé, servitude ou esclavage ne peut être condamné comme tel.”).36
B. Features Of The European Legal Framework
Besides the determination of the specific dispute that was brought
before it, the Court on a more general level outlines the legal framework
under which states are required to take action to secure the prohibition of
slavery, servitude and forced labor. Two significant features of this framework will be highlighted here: the connection that is established between
the three concepts of slavery, servitude and forced labor, as well as the
prominent role given to national criminal law to ensure the effectiveness
of the right not to be held in a form of contemporary slavery.
The path followed by the Court37 when discussing the question of the
classification of the facts in Siliadin makes it clear that it adopts an approach like the one well established under Article 3 of the Convention.38
In interpreting the provision, the Court relies on a hierarchy introduced
into the three phenomena, in accordance with the degree of severity of
their harmful effect on victims. This is not surprising inasmuch as the early
35.
See Florence Massias, L’arrêt Siliadin: L’esclavage domestique demande une incrimination spécifique, 1 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 153
(2006) (Fr.).
36.
at 81.

COMMISSION

NATIONALE CONSULTATIVE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME,

supra note 11,

37.
See Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 120–21(“In these circumstances, the Court
considers that the applicant was, at the least, subjected to forced labour within the meaning of
Article 4 of the Convention at a time when she was a minor”; “It remains for the Court to
determine whether the applicant was also held in servitude or slavery” (emphasis added)).
38.
ECHR, supra note 21, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment of punishment.”); See Frédéric Sudre, Esclavage domestique et Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme, JCP. Ed. G. 19 Oct. 2005, no. 42, II, 10142.
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case law regarding the Convention had already read the structure of the
provision as indicating that
[t]here is [. . .] a difference of degree between the situations covered by th[e two separate paragraphs of Article 4], inasmuch as
slavery and servitude involve the person’s position as a whole,
which is not generally the case for forced or compulsory labor.
Indeed, in contrast to slavery and servitude, the former usually is
temporary and occasional. (“[i]l existe [. . .] une différence de
degré entre les situations envisagées par ces deux dispositions,
dans la mesure où l’esclavage et la servitude investissent le statut
d’une personne dans sa totalité, ce qui n’est en général pas le cas
du travail forcé ou obligatoire. En effet, contrairement à
l’esclavage et à la servitude, celui-ci revêt normalement un
caractère temporaire ou occasionnel.”)
Additionally,
[. . .] servitude is a specific form of slavery, which differs from it
less in character than in degree. Although it constitutes a condition and it entails a “particularly serious form of denial of freedom”, it indeed does not include the powers attached to the right
of ownership that labels slavery. Unlike forced labor, servitude
however presumes more than the obligation to perform certain
services under coercion. (“[. . .] la servitude est une forme particulière d’esclavage, qui s’en distingue moins par la nature que par le
degré. Bien qu’elle constitue un état, et qu’elle implique une
« forme particulièrement grave de négation de la liberté », elle ne
comprend en effet pas les attributs du droit de propriété caractéristiques de l’esclavage. A la différence du travail forcé, la servitude suppose en revanche plus qu’une obligation de prêter des
services sous l’empire de la contrainte.”)39
Still, this approach informs the definitions of the three concepts, since it
articulates “an escalating continuum” from “most to least abusive [practices], with slavery forming the gravest abuse, servitude less so, and forced
labor by comparison the least abusive.”40 Therefore, beyond the specific
definition assigned to each of the concepts, the latter is to be understood
through the underlying premise that all slavery encompasses servitude and
all servitude encompasses forced labor.41

39.

Giorgio Malinverni, Article 4, in LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE
COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE, 177, 178–79 (Louis-Edmond Pettiti, Emmanuel Decaux, Pierre-Henri Imbert eds., 1999).
L’HOMME,

40.

STOYANOVA, supra note 32, at 285.

41.
For an analogous assertion by the former European Commission of Human Rights
under Article 3, see Greece v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 176/56 and 299/57, Eur.
Comm’n H.R. 175, referred to by Frédéric Sudre, Article 3, in supra note 38, at 159.
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Furthermore, such a scheme is linked to a specific methodology for
the Court to determine whether specific factual circumstances should be
classified as one or another form of contemporary slavery. When assessing
a given situation, the Court typically follows a step by step process, starting with the examination of the submitted facts with respect to the lower
threshold – which triggers the applicability of Article 4 – before ascertaining, subject to the terms of the dispute between the parties, whether the
factual circumstances reach the higher thresholds of severity.42
Last, and importantly, the abundant case law generated under Article
343 demonstrates that the Court has made use of this “gradation model”44
to exercise its progressive interpretation of the Convention’s provisions.
Indeed, from its early case law onwards, the Court has shown a “deliberate
intent [. . .] to provide effective protection of human rights, in accordance
with the principle of effectiveness and reiterating that the Convention,
which must be interpreted “in the light, among others, of changes in science and society,” is intended to guarantee “not theoretical or illusory
rights, but rights that are practical and effective” (“[. . .] volonté délibérée
[. . .] d’assurer une protection efficace des droits de l’homme, conformément au principe de l’effet utile et en rappelant que la Convention qui doit
être interprétée « à la lumière, notamment de l’évolution de la science et
de la société », a pour but de protéger des droits, « non pas théoriques et
illusoires, mais concrets et effectifs. »”).45 As a result of this constant concern to make the Convention a living and dynamic instrument and adaptable, where necessary, to present-day living conditions in Europe, the Court
has adopted a principle of evolutive interpretation that it combines with a
range of other principles of interpretation depending on the specific
case.46 Regarding the gradation model, through which it ensures the right
not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment, the
Court, relying on the premise that the standards it sets can develop over
time, has in the late nineties and after a decade of voluminous case law
lowered the threshold required for conduct to be classified as torture.47
Therefore, one should consider that the realm of each concept enshrined
in Article 4 – and consequently the factual situations that they cover – is
alterable and might evolve in the future.
42.
See, e.g., Massias, supra note 35, at 142.
43.
ECHR art. 3 prohibits torture as well as inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; see supra note 38.
44.
STOYANOVA, supra note 32, at 286.
45.
Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod, Règles, méthodes et principes d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, in supra note 39, at 62.
46.
This principle of interpretation is consistent with the Court’s assertion that it is not
bound by its previous decisions (see Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod, Règles, méthodes et principes
d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, in supra
note 39, at 52 (quoting the Cossey case)); For the limitations of this principle, see e.g. François
Ost, Originalité des méthodes d’interprétation de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, in
RAISONNER LA RAISON D’ETAT, VERS UNE EUROPE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, 443–5
(Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1989).
47.
Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 101.
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Turning to the measures required for states to fulfill their obligations
under Article 4, beginning with Siliadin, the Court clearly focused on criminal law: it not only rejected the defending state’s argument that civil proceedings could represent an effective framework to secure the rights
protected by Article 4, but also held explicitly that the positive obligations
under this provision encompass an obligation to penalize the practices and
acts that fall into the scope of the provision, as well as to prosecute effectively the perpetrators of such acts.48 Thus, the Court expanded what an
author has termed [its] “repressive function” (“l’office répressif de la
Cour”)49 to Article 4, and plainly set national penal law up as the chief
tool to achieve effective enforcement of the right not to be subjected to a
severe form of exploitation. It has embraced thereby the view of a complementarity between criminal and human rights law, beyond the somewhat
opposed logics that underlie the two fields of law.50 Within the framework
set out by the Court, the two assertions according to which a phenomenon
is a “violation of human rights” and is to be considered a crime are complementary and intrinsically linked.51
However, it should not be overlooked that in the Court’s view, what
must especially be considered are national criminal provisions together
with national judicial authorities’ practices. This stems from the elaboration it provides that “[e]ffective deterrence is indispensable in this area
[where fundamental values are at stake] and it can be achieved only by
criminal-law provisions.”52 Therefore, the very obligation incumbent on
states is a duty to implement the relevant penal framework in a way that
demonstrates an ability to provide an effective protection to potential victims from being subjected to modern-day slavery.53 It is thus implied that
the states could be accountable, indirectly, for their criminal policy on the
matter. The French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights
has incidentally acknowledged this finding when observing that “[. . .] it
would be appropriate to forthwith address the lack of penal policy regarding [. . .] exploitation. Failing that, only undeclared work or illegal residence, for instance, tends to be punished while they could be perceived as
an indicator of [. . .] exploitation.” (“[. . .] il conviendrait de remédier au
plus vite à l’absence de politique pénale relative [. . .] à l’exploitation. A
défaut, seuls le travail illégal et le séjour irrégulier tendent, par exemple, à
48.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 112.

49.
Jean-Pierre Marguenaud, L’office du juge et la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme, in JUSTICE & CASSATION, 140 (Dalloz, 2010).
50.

See generally STOYANOVA, supra note 34, at 407–43.

51.
See Claudia Lam, La Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la lutte contre la traite
des êtres humains et les droits de l’homme, in L’HOMME ET LE DROIT, 494 (A. Pedone ed.
2014).
52.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 144.

53.
See Damien Roets, L’article 4 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme
une nouvelle fois violé par la France, 1 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL
COMPARÉ151 (2013) (Fr.).
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être réprimés alors même qu’ils pourraient être considérés comme un possible symptôme de faits [. . .] d’exploitation.”).54
C. Shortcomings Inherent in the European Legal Framework
Following from these developments, we can identify several of the
challenges to which the system of the ECHR gives rise when national authorities, particularly those operating under a civil law system, engage in
the setting up of criminal provisions meant to bring their domestic law into
conformity with their international commitments. Since the contracting
states have to fulfill an obligation to make each of the three forms of exploitation contained in Article 4 an offense, they might be inclined to
model the national penal definitions on the European standards as defined
by the case law of the ECtHR.
However, against the backdrop of the civil law systems and their tradition of written, codified law, the principle of legality and its inherent
lexcerta principle demand that the lawmakers55 describe precisely the action, attributable to the offender, which is punishable under the law.56
Therefore, a first mismatch arises in that the Court draws the outlines of
the three distinct phenomena through indications that describe the situation of victims, since they are the ones entitled to the right enshrined in
Article 4. In contrast, the penal law is drafted from the perspective of the
behavior of offenders, which necessarily requires that domestic lawmakers
reformulate all of the definitional parameters identified at the European
level into precise acts that depict the corresponding criminal conduct.
Moreover, the assessment method associated with the gradation model –
and its premise that all slavery includes servitude and all servitude includes forced labor – contributes to scrambling the European template
insofar as it implies the use of the same set of facts to characterize, in a
given case, several of the three concepts. Regarding the demands of criminal law, an additional difficulty lies in the prospectively changing thresholds delineated by the Court. Since it is established under the principles of
interpretation used by the Court that the latter might raise the standards
in the future by lowering the thresholds for meeting a determination of
each one of the three concepts,57 national lawmakers should accordingly
54.
COMMISSION NATIONALE CONSULTATIVE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, Avis sur la
traite et l’exploitation des êtres humains en France, 8 (2009), http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/
files/09.12.18_avis_traite_et_lexploitation_des_etres_humains_en_france.pdf.
55.
It is generally held that Continental legal systems give a substantial role to Parliament in precisely defining penal offenses, while in Common Law jurisdictions, judges bear a
greater responsibility in defining the constitutive elements of offenses. However, this approach must be nuanced, as first there are significant variations in States’ constitutional organization within each system, and second the practical reality may lead to different
developments that erase such a clear distinction. For instance, for a comparative analysis of
approach in Italy and Anglo-American systems, see Daria Sartori, The lex certa principle –
From the Italian Constitution to the European Convention on Human Rights (2014) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Trento, Italy), http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/1172/1/TESI.pdf.
56.
We return to this below, see infra III-E pp. 492–93.
57.
See, e.g., Massias, supra note 35, at 154.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\38-3\MIL303.txt

470

unknown

Seq: 16

Michigan Journal of International Law

6-APR-18

9:19

[Vol. 38:455

make sure to inject into the definition of the penal offenses the factor of
flexibility (through the definitional elements as well as the wording) that
would enable judges to follow these European developments by interpreting fittingly the constituent elements of the crimes.58 This goes far beyond
what is commonly expected from lawmakers and judges in order to keep
national criminal provisions adjusted to the potential evolution of both
criminal conduct and international law. In the present case, indeed, the
lexcerta principle requires legislators to envision legal definitions that are
precise enough to clearly distinguish between behaviors that constitute
forced labor, servitude and slavery. At the same time, the degree of flexibility should make it possible to qualify conduct that must undoubtedly be
prosecuted and sentenced as servitude today as slavery in the future.
Furthermore, and crucially, the existing definitions of the European
standards are far from complete, as the sparse case law under Article 4 has
not allowed the Court to remove all of the uncertainties regarding the
distinctions between and the meanings of the three types of exploitative
situations. Two major issues will be discussed in further detail below: the
distinction between servitude and slavery under European law and the
realm of the three types of exploitation enshrined by the ECHR regarding
the widespread distinction between sexual and economic exploitation.
The European Court of Human Rights has to date found two contracting states in violation of Article 4 of the ECHR regarding an economically exploitative situation that it has classified as servitude. As a result, it
has provided some comprehensive indications as to the scope of this form
of exploitation.59 Further, most scholars who have published on the definition(s) of contemporary slavery set out that the Court has reached a definition of slavery within the regional system of the Council of Europe60 in
two major cases,61 which show an evolving approach of the concept by
European judges. The present section does not aim to trace in detail the
stance adopted by the Court through its case law as to the legal meaning of
slavery. Rather, it takes as ruled in the most recent judgments of the
58.
Commenting on Selmouni, an author has expressed the issue in the following
terms: “The refinement of the standard (the norm), which is made more demanding for
states, must entail another classification policy” (« L’affinement du standard (la norme),
rendu plus exigeant pour les Etats, doit determiner une autre politique de qualification »).
Jacques Leroy, La qualification du fait et l’interprétation de la loi, in HISTOIRE ET MÉTHODES
D’INTERPRÉTATION EN DROIT CRIMINEL, 45 (Dalloz, 2015). However, a move in the classification policy requires that the definitions of the offenses technically allow for it.
59.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.; C.N. & V. v. France, App. No. 67724/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2012); C.N v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08, 2012-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. .
60.
See, e.g., STOYANOVA, supra note 32, at 248–51; Jean Allain, The Definition of
“Slavery” in GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CRIME OF ENSLAVEMENT WITHIN THE
ROME STATUTE, ¶¶ 36–37 (2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/069658BB-FDBD4EDD-8414-543ECB1FA9DC/0/ICCOTP20070426Allain_en.pdf; Holly Cullen, Contemporary International Legal Norms of Slavery, Problems of Judicial Interpretation, and Application, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY – FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE
CONTEMPORARY, 308-10 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
61.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122; Rantsev v. Cyprus & Russia, App. No.
25965/04, 51 Eur. H. R. Rep.1, ¶¶ 279–82.
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Court,62 that the latter, relying on both the 1926 Slavery Convention and
the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), understands slavery within the meaning of the ECHR
as including de facto situations of slavery as well as de jure slavery.63 Nevertheless, this assertion does not exhaust the questions related to the border between slavery and servitude. On the contrary, close scrutiny of all
existing defining elements throughout the case law confirms the lack of
clear indication of what kind of de facto modern-day exploitation falls
within the scope of slavery as opposed to servitude. The main issue here
arises from the reference by the Court alternately to “the exercise of a
genuine right of ownership” and to the “the exercise of powers attaching
to the right of ownership,”64 as well as to the jurisprudence of the ICTY,
according to which “[i]n assessing whether a situation amounts to a contemporary form of slavery, [. . .] relevant factors includ[e] whether there
was control of a person’s movement or physical environment, whether
there was an element of psychological control, whether measures were
taken to prevent or deter escape and whether there was control of sexuality and forced labor.”65 Hence, the Court unequivocally follows the 1926
Convention’s definition of slavery and ensures the translation of its param62.
Namely, Rantsev, 51 Eur. H. R. Rep. ¶¶ 279–82, and M. & Others v. Italy & Bulgaria, App. No. 40020/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
63.
Siliadin is the first case in which the Court has considered the scope of “slavery”
under Article 4 ECHR. The wording it then used to define slavery, referring to a “genuine
right of legal ownership over [a person], reducing thus [the latter] to the status of an “object””
(Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 122, (emphasis added)), has prompted an almost unanimous criticism by scholars, who stressed a “truly narrow interpretation of the provisions of
Article 1(a) of the 1926 Convention” (Allain, supra note 60, ¶ 37), which in practice, “[b]y
requiring the actual exercise of legal ownership, [. . .] denuded the prohibition on slavery of
any utility” (Cullen, supra note 60, at 309). However, while puzzled by the formulation
adopted by the Court, a few authors have read the Court’s statement in a more cautious way
(see, e.g., Massias, supra note 35, at 143, STOYANOVA, supra note 32, at 230, and Antonin
Crinon, La servitude domestique en France et au Royaume-Uni au regard de la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, 466
(2016)), which is consistent with the fact that a literal interpretation of the word “legal”,
precisely by depriving the concept of slavery of any possible practical application in the European area, run counter to the major and constant principle of interpretation used by the
Court, according to which the ECHR’s provisions must “be interpreted and applied so as to
make its safeguards practical and effective” (see e.g., M. and Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶
148.) This more nuanced interpretation of what seems to be a clumsy turn of language is also
corroborated by the fact that this Court’s first consideration on what constitutes “slavery”
was treated in a very short paragraph, which aimed to set aside an issue that was beyond the
terms of the litigation submitted rather than fully dealing with it in order to settle two conflicting argumentations. Finally, it is worth noting that the Court, while clearly referring to a
de facto slavery in Rantsev (51 Eur. H. R. Rep. ¶¶ 280–281), has changed the wording of its
own quotation of Siliadin in Rantsev as well as in M. and Others, holding that it had “referred
to the classic definition of slavery contained in the 1926 Slavery Convention, which required
the exercise of a genuine right of ownership and reduction of the status of the individual
concerned to an “object”” (Rantsev, 51 Eur. H. R. Rep. ¶ 276; M. & Others, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2012), ¶ 149; see also STOYANOVA, supra note 32, at 247.)
64.

See, e.g., Rantsev, 51 Eur. H. R. Rep. ¶¶ 276, 281.

65.

Rantsev, 51 Eur. H. R. Rep. ¶ 280.
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eters into the features of modern forms of slavery by referring to international criminal justice with respect to the crime of “enslavement”. Yet, the
different frameworks in which the notions are defined are not designed
identically, and this impacts the definitions themselves: the presence of a
sole concept leads to an inclination to interpret it broadly, while the gathering of several concepts in a treaty instrument results in an effort to differentiate between them, and therefore to narrow each of the concepts.
Thus, the Trial Chamber of ICTY has specified that its definition of “enslavement” as a crime against humanity “may be broader than the traditional and sometimes apparently distinct definitions of either slavery, the
slave trade and servitude or forced or compulsory labour found in other
areas of international law.”66
Unlike the ICTY regarding the notion of enslavement, the Court at
the same time is required by the European legal framework – and its specific “three-levels scale” model – to draw out and provide substance to the
intermediate category of servitude. In this regard, by referring to the 1926
conventional definition and its criterion of “powers attached to the right of
ownership,” the Court seemingly keeps within the above-mentioned line
initially delineated by the Strasbourg organs, according to which servitude
“does not include the powers attached to the right of ownership that labels
slavery.”67 In addition, the definition of servitude set forth by the Court68
apparently distinguishes the parameters of the notion from the powers attached to the right of ownership. However, when focusing on the factual
elements that the Court put forward in order to substantiate its conclusion
that the type of exploitation it had to deal with amounted to servitude (as
opposed to slavery) in its relevant case law, it emerges that the Court has
actually failed to delimit a separate category of exploitation which would
encompass some specific features of severe forms of exploitation that do
not characterize a power attached to the right of ownership.
Siliadin provides an illustration of this. The judgment’s relevant part
reads:
In addition to the fact that the applicant was required to perform
forced labour, the Court notes that this labour lasted almost fifteen hours a day, seven days per week. She had been brought to
France by a relative of her father’s, and had not chosen to work
for [the perpetrators].
As a minor, she had no resources and was vulnerable and isolated,
and had no means of living elsewhere than in the home of [the
66.
J. & Others v. Austria, App. No. 58216/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶ 15 (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., concurring). See also STOYANOVA, supra note 342, at 231–32.
67.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 122 together with Rantsev, 51 Eur. H. R. Rep. ¶
276 and M. and Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 149; See also supra note 39 and infra note 114.
68.
The Court defines servitude as a “particularly serious form of denial of freedom”
which includes “in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others . . . the
obligation for the ‘serf’ to live on another person’s property and the impossibility of altering
his condition.” Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 123.
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perpetrators], where she shared the children’s bedroom as no
other accommodation had been offered. She was entirely at [the
perpetrators]’s mercy, since her papers had been confiscated and
she had been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, which had never occurred.
In addition, the applicant, who was afraid of being arrested by the
police, was not in any event permitted to leave the house, except
to take the children to their classes and various activities. Thus,
she had no freedom of movement and no free time. As she had
not been sent to school, despite the promises made to her father,
the applicant could not hope that her situation would improve and
was completely dependent on [the perpetrators].
In those circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant,
[. . .], was held in servitude within the meaning of Article 4 of the
Convention.69
A quick review of that factual material by the yardstick of the 1926
conventional definition, notably as it has been unpacked by the Research
Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery,70 reveals that the described
exploitation meets at least two powers attaching to the right of ownership.
First, a combination of several elements tangibly substantiates the existence of a control tantamount to possession71 that was exercised over the
applicant. Indeed, the Research Network has underscored that:
[w]hile the exact form of possession might vary, in essence it supposes control over a person by another such as a person might
control a thing. Such control may be physical, but [. . .][m]ore abstract manifestations of control of a person may be evident in attempts to withhold identity documents; or to otherwise restrict
free movement or access to state authorities [. . .]; or equally in
attempts to forge a new identity through compelling a [. . .] place
of residence [. . .].72
Additionally, through the use of its specific assessment methodology,
the Court had come to the conclusion beforehand that the applicant was
required to perform forced labor, before stressing, in the subsequent stage
of its review, that it “lasted almost fifteen hours a day, seven days per
week”.73 There is therefore no doubt that the perpetrators were also using
69.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 126–29.

70.
See Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, (Mar. 2012),
http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/HumanRights/bellagio/english/.
71.
The Research Network makes a control equivalent to a control exercised over a
thing the major parameter of slavery, as “[it] is foundational in that, not only is it a power
attaching to the right of ownership, it also creates the factual conditions for the exercise of
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership [. . .].” Id. at guideline 3.
72.
Id.
73.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 120, 126.
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her through “the derived benefit from [her] services or labor [. . .].”74 Yet
the definitional reference to “any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership” logically leads to the inference that “[h]aving established control tantamount to possession, the act of using that person [is] an
act of slavery.”75 A similar comparative exercise brings to light that Ms.
Siliadin, whose movement and physical environment were both controlled
by the perpetrators, who was held unlawfully on French territory and
therefore in fear of arrest by the police,76 whose identity documents were
confiscated, whose sexuality was controlled inasmuch as she was not allowed to freely leave the perpetrators’ house while being required to share
the bedroom of her employers’ children,77 and who was subjected to
forced labor, was therefore enslaved under the ICTY criteria.78
The ECtHR’s intent to give full effect to the intermediary notion of
servitude, however, cannot reasonably be questioned. As Frédéric Sudre
has argued, “[by] [d]eclining a globalizing interpretation of Article 4§1,
that would have led to equate “servitude” to the outdated notion of “slavery”, the European Judges develop the potential of the notion of “servitude” and makes it an operative concept, [. . .].” (“[en] [r]efusant une
lecture globalisante de l’article 4§1, qui aurait conduit à assimiler la « servitude » à la notion datée d’ « esclavage », le juge européen libère les
potentialités de la notion de « servitude » et en fait un concept utile,
[. . .].”)79 As such an approach entails that “servitude” is likely to capture
a significant part of slavery-related practices,80 it becomes clear that the
process of defining slavery as set out in the ECHR is still ongoing,81 and
74.

Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, supra note 70, at guideline 4(b).

75.

Id.

76.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118.

77.
As previously mentioned, the ICTY refers to the phrase “control of sexuality”.
Strictly speaking, the latter might go beyond cases of sexual exploitation in the strict sense of
the term, in that it also includes all of the situations in which the curtailment of freedom
imposed by the offender entails a de facto significant deprivation of sexuality for workers.
78.
For a similar finding that the exploitative situation experienced by the applicant
amounted to slavery within the meaning of International Law, see, e.g., Cullen, supra note 60,
at 309, and Allain, supra note 60, at ¶ 37; For a comparison between the applicant’s situation
and the historical American slavery, see Rebecca J. Scott, Under Color of Law – Siliadin v.
France and the Dynamics of Enslavement in Historical Perspective, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY – FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY, 152–64 (Jean
Allain ed., 2012).
79.

Sudre, supra note 38, at 1959.

80.

See Massias, supra note 35, at 144.

81.
The Court has supplied some additional clues in M. & Others, expressing the view
that “[. . .] in relation to the events as established by the authorities, [. . .], there is not
sufficient evidence indicating that the first applicant was held in slavery. Even assuming that
the applicant’s father received a sum of money in respect of the alleged marriage, the Court
is of the view that, in the circumstances of the present case, such a monetary contribution
cannot be considered to amount to a price attached to the transfer of ownership, which would
bring into play the concept of slavery.”, adding that “[t]he Court [do not] consider that the
sole payment of a sum of money suffices to consider that there had been trafficking in human
beings.”Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶¶ 161, 163 (emphasis added).
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accordingly the scattered existing guidance of the Court should be read
cautiously. Indeed, having in mind the two-fold function undertaken by
the Court, it appears likely that it is not until the submission of a dispute
that would oppose claims for a classification as slavery/servitude that the
European judges fully elaborate on the very meaning of slavery “in the
light of present-day living conditions.” Furthermore, it is to be expected
that, instead of incorporating all of the behaviors that reflect the exercise
of “any powers attaching to the right of ownership,” the Court would instead narrow the latter concept and restrict the practical scope of slavery,
thereby building a legal definition specific to the European framework.
The second outstanding question to be addressed concerns the application of Article 4 to forms of severe non-economic exploitation of the
individual. At first glance, this point may not seem to raise crucial difficulties. First, the set of basic principles of interpretation established by the
Court82 helps tackle the evolving nature, and thus the variety, of exploitative conduct. Moreover, the three-level grading scheme, by focusing on the
variable degrees of infringement on personal freedom, allows in principle
for the assessment of any form of exploitation, whatever the kind of services an individual is obligated to perform or the sector in which the exploitation occurs. It is worth noting that the International Labour
Conference, which emphasizes that “[a] forced labor situation is determined by the nature of the relationship between a person and an “employer”, and not by the type of activity performed, (. . .),”83 considers in
particular that the scope of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention84 encompasses forced prostitution.85 Nevertheless, the Court has notably dodged
the discussion in the two cases involving sexual exploitation in which it has
rendered a judgment on the merits.86 Rather, in both cases, the Court has
82.

See supra, Part II-B, p. 467.

83.
See ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour (2005), at 6, http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081882.pdf.
84.
ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/fr/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029.
85.
As well as forced begging, forced criminal activity, forced use of a person in an
armed conflict, ritual or ceremonial servitude, forced use of woman as surrogate mothers,
forced pregnancy and illicit conduct of biomedical research on person. See J. & Others, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶ 9 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring) and references. Likewise, Frédéric Sudre continues in the above-mentioned quotation, supra note 79, stating that “[. . .] the
European Judges develop the potential of the notion of “servitude” and makes it a useful
concept, permitting to provide the victims of abhorrent contemporary forms of enslavement
and exploitation of persons (prostitution, domestic slavery, exploitation of begging, organ removal) with the safeguard of the convention.” (“[. . .] le juge européen libère les potentialités
de la notion de « servitude » et en fait un concept utile, permettant d’offrir la garantie de la
convention aux victimes des détestables formes contemporaines d’asservissement et
d’exploitation de la personne (prostitution, esclavage domestique, exploitation de la mendicité, prélèvement d’organes.”) (emphasis added).
86.
Rantsev, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1; L.E. v. Greece, App. No. 71545/12, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2016), (English version not yet available). M. & Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) is not included
here because the accurate factual circumstances, including as to the allegation of sexual exploitation, were a subject of debate.
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discarded the assessing methodology associated with the gradation model
and has resorted instead to an outside notion to find Article 4 applicable,
classifying the factual circumstances submitted as human trafficking. This
notion, which is absent from the text of the ECHR, is defined by several
specific international and regional instruments in a way that makes plain
that the concept of trafficking, while related to the notions of forced labor,
servitude and slavery, is not synonymous with them.87 Indeed, trafficking
does not designate exploitation itself, but a series of specific actions that
aim to result in severe exploitation of human beings.88 Interestingly, however, the reasoning followed by the European judges to bring human trafficking within the ambit of Article 4 relies on the exercise of powers
attaching to the right of ownership:
The Court considers that trafficking in human beings, by its very
nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers
attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for
little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere
[. . .]. It implies close surveillance of the activities of victims,
whose movements are often circumscribed [. . .]. It involves the
use of violence and threats against victims, who live and work
under poor conditions [. . .].89
Thus, the underlying logic that the ECtHR attributes to trafficking implies
that the latter would equate to slavery.90 Therefore, some authors have
87.
For a comprehensive presentation of the articulation of these concepts, see, e.g., J.
& Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶¶ 17–21 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring).
88.
The definition enshrined in the Protocol of Palermo reads: “The recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) (entered into force
Sept. 9, 2003) (emphasis added). The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings ((ETS No. 197), Warsaw, 16.V.2005) and the European Union Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings (Directive 2011/36/EU of 5
April 2011 on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its
Victims) adopt an analogous definition.
89.

Rantsev, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep, ¶ 281 (emphasis added).

90.
For a criticism of this analysis, see Jean Allain, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia: The
European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery, 3 HUM RTS. L. REV. 546,
546–57 (2010), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r26537.pdf; See also Vladislava Stoyanova,
Dancing on the Borders of Article 4: Human Trafficking and the European Court of Human
Rights in the Rantsev Case, NETH. Q. OF HUM.RTS. 163, 163–94 (2012), https://works.bepress
.com/vladislava_stoyanova/5/.
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unsurprisingly read the gravest type of exploitative situations prohibited
by Article 4 as systematically covering sexual exploitation, which is to be
labeled “trafficking,”91 and not slavery.
Furthermore, in the subsequent case C.N. and V. v. France, the Court
denied the classification of a domestic servitude situation in terms of trafficking, stating that:
[i]t is true that in the case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia [. . .]
the Court affirmed that human trafficking itself falls within the
scope of Article 4 of the Convention insofar as it is without doubt
a phenomenon that runs counter to the spirit and purpose of that
provision. However, it considers that, above all, the facts of the
present case concern activities related to “forced labour” and “servitude,” legal concepts specifically provided for in the Convention.
Indeed, the Court considers that the present case has more in
common with the Siliadin case than with the Rantsev case.92
The European jurisprudence thus appears to outline a system in which the
three “legal concepts specifically provided for in the Convention” would
be meant to exclusively capture economic forms of modern-day slavery,
while all other aspects of contemporary slavery, including sexual exploitation,93 would benefit from the protection of Article 4 through the external
concept of trafficking.
However, several arguments rebut this conclusion. First, the Court repeatedly refers to Siliadin in its subsequent case law as involving “treatment associated with trafficking.”94 Second, the approach adopted by the
Court in Rantsev as well as in L.E. may have been driven by other considerations: in the latter, indeed, no dispute was raised as to the qualification
of the factual circumstances of the case, with both the applicant and the
state agreeing that they constituted trafficking.95 Also, in the former, the
Court was practically unable to determine whether the situation to which
the victim had been subjected to amounted to forced labor, servitude or
slavery96 because of a lacking investigation by the domestic authorities.97
91.
See, e.g., Jean-François Renucci, Esclavage domestique et droits de l’homme:
l’indispensable réforme, 4 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ
926 (2013) (Fr.).
92.
C.N. & V., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 88 (emphasis added).
93.
The above international definition of trafficking also includes, as forms of exploitation, exploitation of begging, exploitation of criminal activities and organs removal. Accordingly, a similar question as to the one developed here might arise in the future regarding
these three latter types of exploitation.
94.
Rantsev, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 279; M. & Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 150.
95.
L.E. v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), ¶ 58.
96.
See, e.g., Stoyanova, supra note 90, at 167, 172.
97.
Admittedly, the Court in M. and Others has explicitly mentioned a similar difficulty (¶ 152), whereas in Rantsev such argument is not put forward. However, it is important
to note that in the former case the Court came to a decision of inadmissibility in that the
complaint was deemed manifestly ill-founded, while in the latter it found one of the defending states in violation of Article 4. Therefore, highlighting at the same time that it was unable,
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Most importantly, such an understanding of Article 4 would not be strictly
consistent with international law: as mentioned above, the international
definition of trafficking lists several specific actions – recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons – that become outlawed when executed in a way that facilitates or arranges the exploitation
of human beings, and it necessarily entails that a victim of severe exploitation within the economic area might be legally considered as a victim of
trafficking for the purpose of forced labor, servitude or slavery. Indeed,
since the international definition of trafficking explicitly refers to forced
labor, servitude, and slavery as possible forms of human exploitation, economic exploitation that amounts to forced labor, servitude or slavery and
meets the other elements in the definition constitutes trafficking: therefore
it cannot be held that the two series of concepts are mutually exclusive.98
The recent case of J. and Others v. Austria,99 which concerns three applicants allegedly exploited in domestic chores, seems to confirm this reading: while the Court succinctly concluded that the factual circumstances of
the case fall within the scope of Article 4 without further classifying
them,100 the whole legal debate explicitly centered on the criminal phenomenon of trafficking.101
Having brought to light the main patterns that characterize the European legal framework applicable to the prohibition of severe forms of
human exploitation, as well as some of its unresolved legal issues, I now
turn to the French legislature, to review how it has addressed the challenges in shifting from the European requirements to a specific domestic
criminal statute.

without using an external notion, to assess whether the threshold for applicability of Article 4
was reached would certainly have weakened its ultimate finding.
98.
See, e.g., J. & Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring)
(noting in ¶ 40 that: “Not ‘all forced labour is trafficking’, just as not ‘all trafficking is slavery’. . . The trafficking process itself is a preparatory stage of the ensuing exploitation and
therefore is attached to each of the three proscribed conducts in Article 4. But there can be
trafficking in human beings without subsequent exploitation and there can be exploitation
without previous trafficking.” (emphasis added)).
99.
100.

J. & Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).
Id. ¶ 108.

101.
Id. ¶ 109. While this paper was under its editing process, the ECtHR issued a
judgment in which it provides a strong clarification on this issue, by stating that
“[a]dmittedly, the present case does not concern sexual exploitation as in the Rantsev case.
However, exploitation through work also constitutes an aspect of human trafficking [. . .]”.
Additionally, it relies on the trafficking definition in the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking
Convention to conclude that “[. . .] exploitation through work is one of the forms of exploitation covered by the definition of human trafficking, and this highlights the intrinsic relationship between forced or compulsory labor and human trafficking.” (reference omitted)
Chowdury & Others v. Greece, App. No. 21884/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶ 93. However, it
still remains to be clarified whether the three concepts of slavery, servitude, and forced labor
are confined to economic forms of exploitation, or if they could potentially cover other exploitative forms.
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III. THE LAW N°2013-711 OF 5 AUGUST 2013 AND THE FRENCH
DEFINITIONS OF SLAVERY, SERVITUDE,
AND FORCED LABOUR
Following a somewhat garbled adoption process,102 the French state,
with the enactment of law n°2013-711 of 5 August 2013,103 supplemented
its criminal legislation by inserting into its penal code a set of four offenses, in part to respond to prior condemnations by the ECtHR.104
Records of the debates make plain that by so doing, the French authorities
finally tackled the grounds of the flaw that undermined the existing criminal provisions and that ultimately had led to a sanctioning by international
judges. While admitting that what these provisions captured were some
manifestations of modern-day slavery,105 significant attention was given to
the view that defining the new offenses required grasping the essence of
these criminal phenomena.106 However, the task to be undertaken was not
limited to such an approach. Rather, it was three-fold: not only had the
national legislature to embed the ECtHR’s indications throughout its jurisprudence to ensure compliance with human rights standards, but it also
had to consider the requirement, imposed at the European level, to formu102.
For further details on this law’s adoption, see, e.g., Olivier Pluen, Le crime de réduction en esclavage Ou l’incrimination du “Coeur de l’esclavage moderne” en droit pénal
interne par la loi du 5 août 2013, 1 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNALCOMPARÉ 29 (2015) (Fr.).
103.
Loi 2013-711 du 5 août 2013 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation dans le
domaine de la justice en application du droit de l’Union européenne et des engagements
internationaux de la France [Law 2013-711 of August 5, 2013 on Various Adaptation Provisions in the Field of Justice in Applying European Union Law and France’s International
Commitments], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette
of France], Aug. 6, 2013, p. 13338, (Fr.).
104.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.; C.N. & V. v. France, App. No. 67724/09, Eur Ct.
H.R. (2012).
105.
Alain Richard, rapport n° 596 du 22 mai 2013 fait au nom de la commission des
lois, Sénat, 1ère lecture [Report No. 596 of May 22, 2013 prepared on behalf of the Committee
on Laws, Senate, 1st Sitting], 39, http://www.senat.fr/rap/l12-596/l12-5961.pdf (Fr.).
106.
See, e.g., Axelle Lemaire, compte-rendu intégral des débats, Assemblée Nationale.,
lecture après CMP, 1ère séance du 23 juill. 2013 [Full Report of the Debates, National Assembly, 1st Sitting of July 23, 2013], 95 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], 8362, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/cri/2012-2013-extra/20131026.pdf, (Fr.).; “[a] complex reality by nature, slavery [. . .] should not be reduced to
an addition of the elements that compose it: very high restless workload, absence of or inadequate payment, withholding of identity documents, threats, bullying, [. . .], control of personal
links, discriminatory living conditions in the household, deprivation of liberty of movement,
[. . .]. Beyond the fact that it is difficult to bring evidence of these components, they are not
sufficient to define slavery [. . .]” (“Réalité complexe par nature, l’esclavage [. . .] ne se
résume pas à l’addition des éléments qui le constituent: charge exorbitante de travail sans
repos, absence ou insuffisance de rémunération, rétention des documents d’identité,
menaces, brimades, [. . .], contrôle des liens personnels, conditions de vie discriminatoires au
sein du foyer, privation de liberté d’aller et venir, [. . .]. Au-delà du fait qu’il est difficile
d’apporter la preuve de ces éléments constitutifs, ils ne suffisent pas à définir l’esclavage
[. . .]”).
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late an efficient repressive tool.107 Furthermore, and crucially, the significant place that international law occupies in that area should not “[. . .]
detract from [the] quality requirements inherent in the penal norm that
becomes internal through the effect of transposition.” (“[. . .] fai[re] oublier [les] critères de qualité inhérents à la norme pénale devenue interne
par le jeu de la transposition.”).108
The four offenses read:
Art. 225-14-1. – Le travail forcé est le fait, par la violence ou la
menace, de contraindre une personne à effectuer un travail sans
rétribution ou en échange d’une rétribution manifestement sans
rapport avec l’importance du travail accompli. Il est puni de sept
ans d’emprisonnement et de 200 000 =
C d’amende. (“Forced labor
is the act of constraining a person, by threat or violence, to perform unpaid work or work against which a payment is made which
clearly bears no relation to the amount of work performed. It is
punishable by seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 200 000
=
C .”)
Art. 225-14-2. – La réduction en servitude est le fait de faire subir,
de manière habituelle, l’infraction prévue à l’article 225-14-1 à une
personne dont la vulnérabilité ou l’état de dépendance sont apparents ou connus de l’auteur. Elle est punie de dix ans
d’emprisonnement et de 300 000 =
C d’amende. (“Reduction to servitude is the act of habitually subjecting a person whose vulnerability or dependence is obvious or known to the offender to the
offense provided for in Article 225-14-1. It is punishable by ten
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 300 000 =
C .”)
Art. 224-1 A. - La réduction en esclavage est le fait d’exercer à
l’encontre d’une personne l’un des attributs du droit de propriété.
La réduction en esclavage d’une personne est punie de vingt années de réclusion criminelle. [. . .]. (“Reduction to slavery is the
act of exercising over a person one of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership.
Reducing a person to slavery is punishable by twenty years’ criminal imprisonment. [. . .].”)
Art. 224-1 B. – L’exploitation d’une personne réduite en esclavage
est le fait de commettre à l’encontre d’une personne dont la réduction en esclavage est apparente ou connue de l’auteur une
agression sexuelle, de la séquestrer ou de la soumettre à du travail
107.
See Alain Richard, compte-rendu intégral des débats, Sénat, séance du 25 juill.
2013 [Full Report of the Debates, Senate, Sitting of July 25, 2013], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 7709, https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201307/s20130725/s20130725.pdf (Fr.).
108.
Marie-Hélène Gozzi, La loi du 5 août 2013: quand l’importance du texte n’emporte
pas qualité normative, 41 RECUEIL DALLOZ 2721 (2013) (Fr.).
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forcé ou du service forcé. L’exploitation d’une personne réduite
en esclavage est punie de vingt années de réclusion criminelle.
(“Exploitation of a person reduced to slavery is the act of committing against a person whose reduction to slavery is obvious or
known to the offender a sexual assault, of confining him/her illegally or of subjecting him/her to forced labor or forced service.
Exploitation of a person reduced to slavery is punishable by
twenty years’ criminal imprisonment. [. . .].”)
Despite lawmakers’ real concern to follow the ECtHR’s prescriptions as
closely as possible, a thorough assessment of the four provisions shows
that several flaws are likely to severely undermine the prosecution of offenses thus defined, impeding the effective punishment of the perpetrators
of contemporary forms of slavery. This rebuts the quasi-unanimous assertion that these provisions have brought the French legislation into conformity with relevant international law.109 Two series of shortcomings are
further analyzed here: the articulation between servitude and forced labor
and the definition of reduction into slavery through partial reference to
the 1926 convention’s definition.
D.

The Problematic Linkage of Servitude with Forced Labour

The French penal code defines servitude through reference to the offense of forced labor. It thereby translates literally the specification given
by the ECtHR in C.N. and V, according to which “servitude corresponds
to a special type of forced or compulsory labor or, in other words, ‘aggravated’ forced or compulsory labor.”110 The French Senate’s Rapporteur
on the draft law has explained the option finally chosen in the following
words:
Slavery differs from servitude in that the latter fully falls within
the labor sphere. [. . .]. Our impression was, particularly after a
close reading of the European convention for the protection of
109.
For an assertion of conformity to the ECHR, see, e.g., Nicolas Le Coz, La répression des atteintes aux personnes dans la loi n° 2013-711 du 5 août 2013, AJ PÉNAL, 512, 514
(2013) (Fr.); A similar assertion as to conformity to forced labor ILO instruments’ obligations
has been reiterated throughout the domestic procedure for ratifying the Protocol of 2014 to
the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 adopted June 11, 2014, 53 I.L.M. 1232 (entered into
force Nov. 9, 2016); see, e.g., Boinali Saı̈d, Commission des affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée
Nationale, 15 mars 2016, séance de 16h30, compte-rendu n° 54 [Foreign Affairs Committee of
the National Assembly, Mar. 15, 2016, Sitting of 4:30 P.M., Report No. 54], http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cafe/15-16/c1516054.asp) (Fr.) and Gaëtan Gorce, rapport n° 317,
Sénat, session ordinaire 2015-2016 [Report No. 317, Senate, Regular Session 2015-2016],
https://www.senat.fr/rap/l15-317/l15-3171.pdf (Fr.). Finally, for an assertion of consistency to
the 1926 Convention by the then-Minister of Justice, see Christiane Taubira, compte-rendu
intégral des débats, Sénat, lecture après CMP, séance du 25 juillet 2013 [Full Report of the
Debates, Senate, Sitting of July 25, 2013], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 7711, 7712, https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201307/s201307
25/s20130725.pdf (Fr.).
110.
C.N. & V., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 91.
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human rights, that the field of exercise, if I may say, of servitude is
confined to the one of labor - that is the reason that explains that
we have so to speak extracted or extended the definition of servitude from the offense of forced labor -, whereas slavery implies
the perpetration by the dominator of an exploitation that goes beyond labor, including exploitation of persons in general by depriving them of all freedom and by committing sexual abuses against
them. (“L’esclavage diffère de la servitude en ce que celle-ci
relève entièrement du domaine du travail. [. . .]. Il nous a semblé,
notamment à la lecture attentive de la convention européenne de
sauvegarde des droits de l’homme, que le domaine d’exercice, si
j’ose dire, de la servitude se cantonnait à celui du travail – c’est la
raison qui explique que nous ayons donc en quelque sorte extrait
ou prolongé la définition de la servitude à partir du délit de travail
forcé -, alors que l’esclavage implique l’exercice par le dominateur
d’une exploitation qui va au-delà du travail, notamment
l’exploitation de manière générale de la personne en la privant de
toute liberté et en pratiquant des abus sexuels à son encontre.”)111
Hence, within the labor sphere that gathers them, forced labor and
servitude are distinguished from each other by “[t]wo degrees, [. . .], in this
set of similar character, which consists in prohibiting the fraudulent obtaining of one or several tasks. When it is no more than a particular task,
this is a kind of extortion which is thus criminalized, except that what is
remitted is not an asset in the strict sense of the term, but someone’s work
effort. [. . .]. When, further, a person’s entire labor capacity is, unwillingly,
wholly assigned to another person, what is fraudulently appropriated is no
longer so much the work itself but the worker. He or she is, says the statutory language, “reduced to servitude”, which is revealed by, on the one
hand the repeated and habitual character of the provision of his/her work
capacity to others and, on the other hand, his/her situation of vulnerability
to the one for whom he/she works.” (“[d]eux degrés, [. . .], dans cet ensemble de même nature, qui consiste à prohiber l’obtention frauduleuse d’un
ou de plusieurs travaux; s’il ne s’agit que d’un travail précis, c’est une sorte
d’extorsion qui se trouve ainsi incriminée, à cette différence près que ce
qui est remis n’est pas un bien au sens restrictif du terme, mais la force de
travail de quelqu’un. [. . .]. Si, au-delà, la force de travail d’une personne
est, contre son gré, totalement affectée à une autre personne, ce n’est plus
tant le travail lui-même qui est approprié frauduleusement, que le travailleur. Il est, dit le texte, « réduit en servitude », ce que révèlerait, d’une
part, le caractère habituel de la fourniture de ses travaux à autrui, et
d’autre part, sa situation de vulnérabilité vis-à-vis de celui pour qui il
travaille.”)112
111.

See Richard, supra note 107, at 7710.

112.
Guillaume Beaussonie, Loi n° 2013-711 du 5 août 2013 portant diverses dispositions
d’adaptation dans le domaine de la justice en application du droit de l’Union Européenne et
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From this accurate analysis of the meaning of the two offenses flows
the theoretical failure that taints the penal definition of servitude: if servitude describes a situation where “what is fraudulently appropriated is no
longer so much the work itself but the worker,” then servitude goes precisely beyond the labor sphere: exploitation affects not only the labor performed by a worker, but rather the person as a whole.113 Such an
understanding of the concept of servitude is actually consistent with the
initial and widely-shared elaboration on the meaning of the three concepts
contained in Article 4, according to which
[. . .] servitude seems to be a special type of slavery differing from
it less by nature than by degree. Unlike forced labour, servitude
presumes more than the obligation to perform certain services
under coercion. It implies a “particularly serious form of denial of
liberty.” But while servitude constitutes a condition, this condition
does not totally equate the powers attaching to the right of ownership that slavery postulates. (“[. . .] la servitude paraı̂t constituer
une forme particulière d’esclavage, s’en distinguant moins par la
nature que par le degré. A la différence du travail forcé, la servitude suppose plus qu’une obligation de prêter des services sous
l’empire de la contrainte. Elle implique « une forme particulièrement grave de négation de la liberté » Seulement, bien que la servitude constitue un état, cet état ne s’identifie pas totalement aux
attributs du droit de propriété que postule l’esclavage”)114
This reveals that the premise on which the definition has been built –
namely, that servitude, like forced labor, is restricted to exploitation of
labor capacity – is incorrect. Moreover, it significantly jeopardizes the application of the provision in practice, as developed below.
The issue at stake here is as follows: by defining servitude as “the act
of habitually subjecting a person whose vulnerability or dependence is obvious or known to the offender to the offense provided for in Article 22514-1,” the provision necessarily imposes on judges, in order to reach a determination of guilt, a duty to establish simultaneously the existence of the
constituent elements specific to the offense of servitude and the existence
of those specific to the offense of forced labor. In other words, for a perpetrator to be found guilty of servitude, he must have subjected a person at
the same time to servitude and forced labor. True, this is what the gradation model adopted by the ECtHR as well as the associated assessment
methodology actually presume and imply. Nevertheless, this runs counter
to the underlying logic of penal procedure, which assumes that prosecutors
des engagements internationaux de la France, 4 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT
PÉNALCOMPARÉ 861, 866–67(2013) (Fr.).
113.

See supra, II-C, pp. 472–74.

114.
Jacques Velu & Rusen Ergec, La Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,
in VII RÉPERTOIRE PRATIQUE DU DROIT BELGE COMPLÉMENT, 225 (Bruylant ed. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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and judges select the one offense that fits each distinctive behavior most
accurately, by using a set of rules aimed at this purpose.115 Admittedly,
the use of one offense as a constituent element of another is theoretically
possible. In such a case, prosecutors are required to charge the perpetrator
only with the latter offense, as “charging with two offenses in these instances would result in reality in punishing twice the same misconduct.”
(“[r]etenir deux incriminations en ces occurrences équivaudrait en réalité
à punir deux fois la même faute.”).116 Therefore, this approach to defining
an offense requires that the felony or misdemeanor to which it refers describes a behavior that is completely absorbed into the broader crime. We
return to this argument in the following paragraphs. Furthermore, in the
end the issue in question directly affects the efficiency of the newly-defined offense. Indeed, the latter’s application implies that a constraint by
threat or violence and a known or obvious vulnerability or dependence,
inter alia, are proven. However, when considering the reality of exploitative situations, it is clear that where a victim is obviously vulnerable or
dependent (bearing in mind that dependency stems from exploitation in
terms of absence of payment), perpetrators make full use of it in order to
exploit the person, and therefore resort to threat or violence117 only incidentally – making it difficult to prove.118
Far from being a mere insignificant question of gathering evidence,
this point raises a crucial issue that the ECtHR has thus far disregarded,
thereby blurring the meaning of the concepts embedded in Article 4. It is
indeed important to note that the Court itself seems to have been confronted with the above practical issue in the two cases against France.
Thus, in Siliadin, before concluding that the factual circumstances of the
case amounted to servitude, the Court, in accordance with its specific
methodology, had to ascertain whether the same circumstances constituted forced labor. Hence, it had to establish whether the applicant’s work
had been “exacted . . . under the menace of any penalty” and “performed
115.
See Philippe Salvage, Concours d’Infractions – concours ideal de qualifications, JCL. PÉNAL FASC. 20 (2002) and Philippe Bonfils, Concours d’Infractions, (Dalloz 2005).
116.
Philippe Conte & Patrick Maistre du Chambon, Droit penal général (Armand
Colin ed., 5th ed.), quoted by Salvage, id. no. 12 (emphasis added).
117.
In the recent report published by the monitoring body of the Council of Europe
Anti-Trafficking Convention (The Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human
Beings (GRETA)), regarding the implementation of this Convention by France, the French
Government stressed that threat and violence here are to be understood within their meaning in criminal law, and that French jurisprudence construes the concept of violence, in particular, extensively (see GRETA (2017) 17, Rapport concernant la mise en œuvre de la
Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la lute contre la traite des êtres humains par la France
¶ 228 (Jul. 6, 2017)). However, the fact that the criminal notion of violence covers all acts or
behaviors causing physical or mental harm through an emotional shock or a psychological
disturbance does not alleviate the burden of proof.
118.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the international definition of trafficking,
when listing the means that vitiate or force victims’ consent, makes the “means of the threat
or use of force”, and the “abuse of a position of vulnerability” two alternative constituent
elements. See supra, note 88.
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against her will.”119 However, to determine that the first criterion was
met, the Court had to step away from the original requirement, considering that “in the instant case, although the applicant was not threatened by
a “penalty”, the fact remain[ed] that she was in an equivalent situation in
terms of the perceived seriousness of the threat.”120 The latter assertion
was based on the facts that “[s]he was an adolescent girl in a foreign land,
unlawfully present on French territory and in fear of arrest by the police,”
a fear that the perpetrators “nurtured.”121 In other words, the Court
reached its finding without identifying any specific threat committed by
the offenders. More interestingly, the factual circumstances supporting the
finding rather describe a situation of obvious vulnerability that the perpetrators used in order to appropriate the applicant’s labor capacity. In C.N.
and V., the question was addressed slightly differently, as the Court discerned the existence of a threat under which the first applicant performed
work, namely the regular “threat of being sent back to her country of origin,” “which [. . .] represented death and abandoning her younger sisters.”122 As a result, the Court first held that the factual circumstances
submitted constituted forced labour. As to the existence of servitude, however, the Court only demonstrated additionally that several elements of
the exploitative situation established “the victim’s feeling that [her] condition [was] permanent and that the situation [was] unlikely to change”123 –
a criterion that under French criminal law is expressed in terms of the
usual character of the provision of work to the offenders. Consequently, it
appears that in the view of the Court, servitude is nothing more than a
sustained situation where work is performed unwillingly and under the effect of a feeling of threat.124 It flows from this approach that the Court
regards the nature of the control that exploiters exercise upon victims to
be similar in situations of forced labor and servitude. This is advanced by
the Court’s constant assertion that “for Convention purposes ‘servitude’
means an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of
coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of ‘slavery’[. . .].”125
In this respect, by linking servitude to forced labor, French lawmakers
have rightly followed the Court’s stance. However, the issue under consideration brings to light that the victim’s impossibility of altering his/her condition, which is set up by the Court as the key feature to distinguish
servitude from forced labor, necessarily corresponds to a shift in the na119.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 117.

120.

Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118.

121.

Id.

122.

C.N. & V., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 78.

123.

Id. ¶ 91.

124.
Id. ¶ 92 (“The Court [. . .] considers that the [. . .] applicant had the feeling that her
condition – that of having to do forced or compulsory labour at the home of Mr. and Mrs. M.
– was permanent and could not change, especially as it lasted four years) (emphasis added)
(reference omitted).
125.
See, e.g., Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 124; (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted).
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ture of the control exercised upon him/her: such control is then no longer
one of mere coercion, but rather one tantamount to possession. There is
indeed an essential difference between a direct compulsion, closely pertaining to the work that is sought, which is exercised upon an individual in
order to temporarily benefit from his/her labor, and a system of wide and
persistent control which aims to permanently deprive an individual from
his/her autonomy and liberty of choice. In the first case, the control exercised by the exploiter is one of direct coercion, which is the specificity of
forced labor, while in the second case the control involved is equivalent to
the type of control exercised upon a thing owned – in other words, a control tantamount to possession. Thus, the Members of the Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery have highlighted that
“[f]undamentally, where such control operates, it will significantly deprive
that person of his or her individual liberty for a period of time which is, for
that person, indeterminate.”126
In reviewing the existing case law related to slavery in all of the relevant international legal systems, Holly Cullen has convincingly stressed
that “[j]udicial attention to the nature of control, and whether it equates to
possession or merely to coercion, is the key element which is often lacking
or under-developed.”127 However, in the case of the ECtHR, judges have
not only overlooked this very question, but they have furthermore set up a
scheme that comprises an intrinsic contradiction. When the Court articulates the guideline principle according to which “ ‘servitude’ means an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion,
and is to be linked with the concept of ‘slavery’ [. . .],”128 it adopts a selfcontradictory formulation, in that a use of coercion differs in nature from
the key power attaching to the right of ownership that characterizes slavery (namely a control tantamount to possession),129 and consequently it is,
as such, de-linked from slavery. Therefore, it is not surprising that Siliadin
has encountered the criticism that the factual elements withheld by the
Court to establish the existence of servitude revealed a control of a nature
of possession.130
Similarly, the seeming consistency of the reasoning in C.N. and V. fails
to convince of the soundness of the Court’s approach. Indeed, a threat that
is uttered towards a worker as a direct compulsion to obtain the immediate performance of specific work should not be mistaken for a general
126.

Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, supra note 70, at guideline 3.

127.

Cullen, supra note 60, at 305.

128.
Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 124. The phrase must be construed in the light
of the wording adopted in the English version of C.N. & V., which reads: “[w]hat servitude
involves is “an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion.”
As such it is to be linked with the concept of “slavery” within the meaning of Article 4 §1 of
the Convention.” C.N. & V., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 89 (emphasis added) (quotations
omitted).
129.

See Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, supra note 70, at guideline 3.

130.
The criticism lies in the fact that this should have consequently led to a classification as slavery instead of servitude; see supra II-C, pp. 472–74.
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atmosphere of fear, where threats are used once in a while in order to
make a person know that he/she is entirely at someone’s mercy. In that
sense, when read together with the other factual elements listed by the
Court in the judgment, the type of threats identified indicated that the
applicant had been subjected to a control that was tantamount to
possession.
True, contemporary exploitative practices often include a wide range
of means of control, combining elements of possession and coercion. However, when qualifying the type of exploitation to which an individual was
subjected during a given period of time, one must consider the nature of
control that this person experienced as a result of all of the means used by
the offender. By retrieving the elements characterizing coercion in order
to establish a qualification as forced labour in the first stage of its assessment, the Court takes a contrived approach that distorts the understanding of modern-day forms of slavery, and ultimately obfuscates the meaning
of the concepts. Finally, it is worth noting that in addition to the gradation
model and the related assessment methodology, which to a certain extent
traps the ECtHR’s view, the ILO’s position131 also contributes to generating this kind of confusion, in that it is based on a similar foundational
misunderstanding.132
E. The Inappropriate Use of the 1926 Convention’s
Definition of Slavery
We turn now to the penalization of slavery. This type of human exploitation is broken down into two distinctive offenses: the reduction to
slavery and the exploitation of a person reduced to slavery. For the purposes of this study, the latter will not be further analyzed as such, as our
131.
In particular, the ECtHR partly bases its reasoning on the ILO’s elaboration on
forced labor, according to which “[t]he penalty does not need to be in the form of penal
sanctions, but may also take the form of a loss of rights and privileges. Moreover, the menace
of a penalty can take many different forms. Arguably, its most extreme form involves physical violence or restraint, or even death threats addressed to the victim or relatives. There can
also be subtler forms of menace, sometimes of a psychological nature. Situations examined
by the ILO have included threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration authorities when their employment status is illegal, or denunciation to village elders in the case of
girls forced to prostitute themselves in distant cities. Other penalties can be of a financial
nature, including economic penalties linked to debts. Employers sometimes also require
workers to hand over their identity papers, and may use the threat of confiscation of these
documents in order to exact forced labour.” Extracts from “The cost of coercion: global report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work”, adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1999; quoted by the ECtHR in
C.N. & V., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 52; See also J. &Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶ 9 (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., concurring) and reference.
132.
The French Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme [National
Advisory Commission on Human Rights] in its 2010 report on trafficking and exploitation of
human beings has precisely pointed out the specific difficulties that stemmed from international bodies, including the ILO supervisory bodies, which adopt varying definitions of the
same-named concepts with the view of indirectly expanding their respective mandates. See
COMMISSION NATIONALE CONSULTATIVE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, supra note 11, at 47.
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focus is instead directed to the definition of slavery. However, it must be
emphasized that the definition of the “exploitation of a person reduced to
slavery,” by referring explicitly to “sexual assault” as well as “forced labor
or forced service,” engages with the issue of the scope’s boundaries of the
notion of slavery in a way that makes the concept cover both economic
and sexual exploitation.133 Therefore, in light of the Rapporteur’s statement that “[s]lavery differs from servitude in that the latter fully falls
within the labor sphere,”134 it appears that within the meaning of the
French definitions, concepts of both forced labor and servitude are confined to economic exploitation, while slavery is meant to include other
areas in which exploitative practices occur.
When defining the offense of reduction to slavery, “[. . .] French
lawmakers have opted for a prudent approach, at the expense of the willingness to set themselves up as innovators in a renewed definition of slavery.” (“[. . .] le législateur français a fait le choix de la prudence, au
détriment de la volonté de s’ériger en précurseur d’une définition renouvelée de l’esclavage.”)135 Indeed, the Rapporteur on the draft law has
elaborated on that “[t]he reference to the “powers attaching to the right of
ownership” is directly built upon Article 1 of the Convention on Slavery of
25 September 1926 [. . .], which provides that “slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership are exercised.”” (“[l]a référence aux « attributs du droit
de propriété » est directement inspirée de l’article 1er de la convention
relative à l’esclavage du 25 septembre 1926 [. . .], qui stipule que
« l’esclavage est l’état ou condition d’un individu sur lequel s’exercent les
attributs du droit de propriété ou certains d’entre eux. »”)136 Nevertheless,
this does not mean that the 1926 Convention’s definition was merely copied into the domestic criminal law. First, the general scheme of the statute
channels the meaning of the offense. In this regard, dividing slavery-related acts into two offenses has been driven by considerations that substantially skew the meaning of the 1926 definition. Relying notably on the
words of the Rapporteur, “slavery is a condition, and what is criminal, is
evidently to subject someone to it” (“l’esclavage est un état, et ce qui est
criminel, c’est évidemment le fait d’y contraindre autrui”),137 Olivier
Pluen has thus stated that through the distinct criminalization of the exploitation of a person reduced to slavery,
[t]he notion of reduction to slavery has been thus brought down to
its core [. . .], whereas the exploitation of a slave has been given its
own definition and penalty. One of the consequences of this differentiation, [. . .], is that slavery henceforth is referred to as a
“condition”, independently of any other activity to which the per133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See infra note 140.
Richard, supra note 107.
Pluen, supra note 102, at 41.
Richard, supra note 105, at 40.
Richard, supra note 102, at 41.
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son concerned is unwillingly subjected. (“[l]a notion de réduction
en esclavage a donc été ramenée à son noyau [. . .], tandis que
l’exploitation de l’esclave a reçu ses propres définition et sanction.
L’une des conséquences de cette distinction, [. . .], est que
l’esclavage se trouve aujourd’hui désigné comme un « état », indépendamment de toute autre activité à laquelle est soumis contre
son gré l’intéressé.”)138
In practice, this implies that the offense of reduction to slavery is not expected to encompass every incident of ownership, as some of them – such
as, for instance, the use or benefit from the services or the labor of a person139 – are meant to be sanctioned under the qualification of “exploitation of a person reduced to slavery.”140 At the same time, the 1926
definition has not been reproduced unaltered: in particular, the expression
“any or all of the powers [. . .]” has been discarded in favor of “exercising
[. . .] one of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.” The variation
leads to an expanded practical scope of the provision because it accentuates the sufficiency of one single incident of ownership to prosecute and
condemn an offender for having reduced an individual to slavery. Thus,
the legislature has adopted wording that counteracts the stated aim of the
statute, which is to narrow the offense of slavery to what is perceived as its
very core, by repressing some powers attaching to the right of ownership
through an associated offense. Therefore, it falls to judges to bring substance to the core of the notion by identifying which attributes of ownership define a “condition” as such, and by thereby delimiting acts that
constitute slavery. Within such a legal context, this inevitably involves
some unpredictability and implies some degree of subjectivity as to the
understanding of slavery.
138.

Id. (emphasis added).

139.
See Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, supra note 70, at guideline 4. This example relies
on the reference to forced labor within the offense of exploitation of a person reduced to
slavery, together with the definition of forced labor in domestic law through an absence of
remuneration of the work performed. On a conceptual level, however, the question whether
the work performed in a context a forced labor systematically constitutes a use of a person’s
labor that equates a power attached to ownership is subject to discussion, but this goes beyond the scope of this study.
140.
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of all of the
foreseeable difficulties that judges may face when enforcing the statute compliantly to the
intention of the legislator. However, the premise on which lawmakers have set up the penalization of slavery surely raises numerous challenges, and in this respect it is worth noting that
two authors have understood the offence of exploitation of an enslaved person as prohibiting
a “concealment” of enslaved persons, thus reading it as requisitely involving a third person
(see Le Coz, supra note 109, at 514; Beaussonie, supra note 112, at 868). Still, the thenMinister of Justice, commenting on that provision, has made it clear that the distinction
rather concerns the kind of behavior involved, mentioning that “the perpetrator of the crime,
knowing that the person is reduced to slavery, adds to it sexual exploitation, illegal confinement and reduction to forced labor.” (“l’auteur du crime, sachant que la personne est réduite
en esclavage, y ajoute l’exploitation sexuelle, la séquestration, la réduction au travail forcé.”)
(emphasis added). Taubira, supra note 109.
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However, beyond these theoretical and practical issues regarding the
application of the provision, the latter application more fundamentally
questions the capacity of the “powers attaching to the right of ownership”
to pinpoint, from a penal standpoint, the concrete behaviors to which the
concept of slavery refers. Commenting on the reason why French
lawmakers have not itemized these powers, an author has noted that
“[f]aithful to the international text, which we regret, just this once, the
legislature has probably deemed that the incidents bestowed to this right,
which are fully characterized under a property law perspective, namely the
usus, fructus and abusus141(including the right to transform the thing),
were transposable to the qualification of a crime related to the infringements of persons’ integrity.” (“[f]idèle au texte international, ce que nous
regrettons, une fois n’est pas coutume, le législateur a sans doute estimé
que les attributs conférés à ce droit, et parfaitement caractérisés dans une
conception civiliste, soit l’usus, le fructus et l’abusus (y compris le droit de
transformer la chose), étaient transposables à la qualification d’un crime
relevant des atteintes aux personnes.”)142 Yet, to take for granted the
transferability and adaptability of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership to acts committed in respect of persons is far from
straightforward.
Indeed, a thorough unpacking of all the incidents of ownership,143
along with their very meaning, shows that some of them at least are unsuitable to the underlying logic of human exploitation. I will first illustrate this
with two examples regarding the right to dispose of one’s property. To that
end, the work of the Members of the Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery provides an appropriate starting point, since they have
explored the meaning of slavery using fact patterns involving “powers attaching to the right of ownership” in the context of exploitation among
persons. They have substantiated that, “[h]aving established control over a
person tantamount to possession, the act of disposing of a person w[ould]
be an act of slavery.”144
Turning now to the criminal law rationale, it must be clarified what
conduct would be classified as an “act of disposing of a person.” From a
property law perspective, it has been acknowledged that “[. . .] the right to
141.
French property law generally refers to the incidents of ownership through the
three Latin words usus, fructus and abusus. While Usus and fructus describe, respectively,
“the right to use” (“le droit d’usage”) and “the right of enjoyment” (“le droit de jouissance”)
strictly speaking, abusus means more broadly “the right for an owner to dispose of a thing
through any acts [. . .] of transformation, consumption, destruction, alienation or abandonment” (“le droit pour le propiétaire d[e] disposer [d’une chose] par tous actes [. . .] de transformation, de consommation, de destruction, d’aliénation ou d’abandon”). Gérard Cornu,
Vocabulaire juridique, 1058, 483, 9 (Presses Universitaires de France, 11th ed. 2016).
142.
Adding the Latin phrase “Summum jus summa injuria!”, Gozzi, supra note 108, at
2722; see also Le Coz, supra note 109, at 514 (internal citations omitted).
143.
See Robin Hickey, Seeking to Understand the Definition of Slavery, in THE LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY – FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY, 220–41
(Jean Allain ed., 2012).
144.
See Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, supra note 70, at guideline 4 (emphasis added).
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dispose is the most abstract of the rights over a thing. It may continue to
exist regardless of any outward manifestation, because it lies entirely in
the owner’s will. An ancient judgment has thus asserted that property is
preserved by the sole effect of intention. [. . .]. Jurisprudence logically concludes that property is not lost through lack of use.” (“[. . .] le droit de
disposer est le plus abstrait des droits sur une chose. Il peut subsister indépendamment de toute manifestation extérieure, car il loge tout entier
dans la volonté du propriétaire. Un arrêt ancien a pu ainsi affirmer que la
propriété se conserve du seul fait de l’intention. [. . .]. La jurisprudence en
conclut très logiquement que la propriété ne se perd pas par le non-usage”).145 Following this reasoning in a criminal modern-day slavery case
would thus lead to the prosecution and punishment of a person for the
mere intent to dispose of an individual, without any concrete external action substantiating it. Moreover, “[the right to dispose] culminates in the
ability of the owner to transfer his/her asset to others, with or without any
economic counterbalance, distant or immediate, as well as to simply abandon it: French law allows for that latter possibility, which nonetheless requires a certainty as to the owner’s intend to irrevocably get rid of his/her
asset.” (“[Le droit de disposer] culmine dans la faculté que détient le
propriétaire de céder son bien à autrui, avec ou sans contrepartie
économique, médiate ou immédiate, ainsi que de l’abandonner purement
et simplement : le droit français admet cette dernière possibilité, qui suppose néanmoins une certitude quant à l’intention du propriétaire de se
défaire irrévocablement de son bien.”)146 When applied to exploitative
practices against a person, it stems from these guiding rules that an offender’s act of ending the situation of slavery, committed with a clear intention to stop the crime, would in itself be a criminal conduct,
materializing an attribute of ownership, and classifiable as such as a “reduction to slavery.”
In addition, some incidents of ownership do not refer to any specific
acts but rather cover an undefined range of behavior. This is especially so
for the right to freely use one’s asset. Robin Hickey has insisted that “[i]n
the context of property, these freedoms are not precisely defined: law does
not precisely demarcate or dictate the range of an owner’s permissible actions or dealings in respect for her thing. [He/she] might make whatever
use of her thing she likes just because she is free to do so.”147 This remark
resonates with comments that have commended the Law of 2013 in that it
“updates judiciously the definition [. . .] of slavery” (“modernise fort opportunément la définition [. . .] de l’esclavage”)148 by enacting an offense
that might encompass “the most contemporary and radical forms [. . .] of
human exploitation” (“les formes les plus contemporaines et les plus radi145.
Alain Sériaux, Propriété, ¶¶ 67–68, ENCYCLOPÉDIE JURIDIQUE DALLOZ (2009)
(internal citations omitted).
146.
Id. ¶ 87.
147.
Hickey, supra note 143, at 231 (emphasis added).
148.
Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Les nouvelles formes d’esclavage et de traite, ou le syndrome
de la ligne Maginot, 8 RECUEIL DALLOZ 491 (2014) (Fr.).
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cales [. . .] d’exploitation des êtres humains”)149, including the exploitation
of “the human biological material.” (“le matériau biologique humain.”)150
Such stance precisely relies on property law’s tenets, further making the
argument that the offense is thus applicable to the “[. . .] forms of human
exploitation [that] do not require to [. . .] appropriate the whole person”
(“formes d’exploitation des êtres humains [qui] ne nécessitent pas [. . .] de
s’approprier la personne dans son entier” )151, as “[i]t suffices to appropriate [its] use (the use of the surrogate mother’s body for instance) or [its]
fruits (organs, gametes, and even children in surrogate motherhood).”
(“[i]l suffit de s’en approprier l’usage (usage du corps de la mère porteuse,
par ex.) ou les fruits (organes, gamètes, et même les enfants dans la gestation pour autrui.)”).152
These points are of particular relevance against the benchmark of
criminal law principles, especially the principle of legality. Admittedly,
“even in criminal law, where language aims at being as accurate as possible, some level of indeterminacy is unavoidable.”153 Therefore, lexcerta
requirements do not preclude the role of judges in clarifying the terms of
penal dispositions, thereby delineating the precise border between lawful
and criminal acts, and, within this latter category, between criminal acts
that must be qualified as one or the other. However, this task must be
strictly confined to interpreting, as opposed to law-making that would
equate and thereby infringe on the power of the legislature.
Yet in the French legal context, the legislature takes a leading role in
defining the elements of these offenses. This means that an approach like
the one adopted by the Australian High Court judges154 is unsustainable
in France because judges would thereby exceed their powers.155 In a civil
law country like France, it is incumbent upon the legislature to elaborate
on the 1926 definition of slavery and identify on a general level, regardless
of any specific circumstances, concrete actions that are to be labeled as
slavery. This requires first isolating the only manifestations of powers attaching to the rights of ownership that are relevant in the context of
149.

Id. at 492.

150.

Id. at 491.

151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Leonardo Augusto de Andrade Barbosa, Behind the Definition of Contemporary
Slavery in Brazil: Concepts of Freedom, Dignity and Constitutional Rights (forthcoming). A
French version of this article has been published: Enjeux de la définition juridique de
l’esclavage contemporain au Brésil: liberté, dignité et droits constitutionnels, 11 BRÉSIL(S) SCIENCES HUMAINES ET SOCIALES (May 2017), http://bresils.revues.org/2111.
154.
The Queen v. Tang, [2008] HCA 39 (Austl.). See also Jean Allain & Robin Hickey,
Property Law and the Definition of Slavery, in THE LAW AND SLAVERY PROHIBITING HUMAN
EXPLOITATION, 485 (Jean Allain ed., 2015) (pointing out that the determination whether
slavery exists is made through analysis of facts amounting to the exercise of “powers attaching to the rights of ownership”, [. . .], bring[ing] [thus] to that [element of] definition the
substance necessary to give it workable contemporary relevance” (emphasis added)).
155.
See Jacques Boré & Louis Boré, La Cassation en Matiere Penale, 254 (Dalloz,
2013).
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human exploitation; second, connecting these manifestations with the
range of existing exploitative practices in order to determine which are
slavery; and ultimately, using these identified acts to formulate the definitional elements of the crime of slavery. It is worth noting that in regard to
the rights of the defense, the principle of legality also embodies the principles of legal predictability and legal security. Consequently, it appears that
the reference to “one of the powers attaching to the right of ownership” as
a constituent element of the offense strongly jeopardizes the provision’s
compliance with the principle of legality. To provide an example of penal
offenses that have been formerly struck down by the French Conseil Constitutionnel, as a result of their failure to comply with the lexcerta requirements,156 the provision that defined sexual harassment as “[t]he act of
harassing a person for the purpose of obtaining favors of sexual nature”
(“[l]e fait de harceler autrui dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature
sexuelle”)157 has been censured for not “defining precisely the elements
constituting this misdemeanor” (“définir précisément les éléments constitutifs de ce délit”).158 Likewise, the specific penal qualification of “incestuous sexual behaviors” (“agissements sexuels incestueux”) has been
declared unconstitutional for not “further specifying what persons should
be regarded, within the meaning of the provision, as family members”
(“désigner précisément les personnes qui doivent être regardées, au sens
de cette qualification, comme membres de la famille”).159
To that extent, Guillaume Beaussonie has emphasized that
As to these “attributes”, while classical legal thought have so well
caricatured them, [. . .], as usus, fructus and abusus160, it must be
realized as well that they aim, in reality, to designate all forms of a
control to which a slave is subjected. [. . .]. Since here lies the gist,
156.
In reviewing the compliance of offenses with the legality principle, the Conseil
constitutionnel also acts “as the guardian of the legislative power” (“en tant que guardien de
la compétence législative”). See Bertrand de Lamy, Le principe de la légalité criminelle dans
la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, 26 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL
20 (2009).
157.
Le Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision no. 2012-240 QPC du 4 mai 2012, ¶ 1, http://
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/
decisions-depuis-1959/2012/2012-240-qpc/decision-n-2012-240-qpc-du-4-mai-2012.105618
.html.
158.

Id. ¶ 2.

159.
Le Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2011-163 QPC du 16 septembre 2011, ¶ 4,
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2011/2011-163-qpc/decision-n-2011-163-qpc-du16-septembre-2011.99681.html. In view of the issue at stake, it is worth citing the text of the
penal provision in full: “Rapes and sexual assaults shall be qualified as incestuous when they
are committed within the family over a minor by a relative in the ascending line, a brother, a
sister or by any person, including a partner a member of family, having legal or de facto
authority over the victim” (“Les viols et les agressions sexuelles sont qualifiés d’incestueux
lorsqu’ils sont commis au sein de la famille sur la personne d’un mineur par un ascendant, un
frère, une sœur ou par toute autre personne, y compris s’il s’agit d’un concubin d’un membre
de la famille, ayant sur la victime une autorité de droit ou de fait.”).
160.

See supra, note 141.
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which is maybe not sufficiently visible when reading the existing
wording of Article 224-1 A – even if this clarification had emerged
during the parliamentary debates: through the exercise of attributes of ownership over a person is effectuated an outright subjection of him/her. By reducing too much the definition in order to
reach the essential points, have we not done today regarding slavery what was done yesterday as regards sexual harassment?
(“Quant à ces « attributs », si la pensée juridique classique les a si
bien caricaturés, [. . .], en usus, fructus et abusus, il faut tout aussi
bien prendre conscience qu’ils ont, en réalité, vocation à designer
toutes les formes d’une emprise qui va être subie par l’esclave.
[. . .]. Car l’essentiel est là, qui n’apparaı̂t peut-être pas suffisamment à la lecture de la rédaction actuelle de l’article 224-1 A – la
precision était pourtant apparue au cours des débats parlementaires: il se produit, par l’entremise de l’exercice d’attributs de
la propriété à son encontre, une veritable sujétion de la personne.
A trop réduire la définition pour parvenir à l’essentiel, n’a-t-on
pas fait aujourd’hui pour l’esclavage ce que l’on avait fait hier
pour le harcèlement sexuel ?”)161
This might be what French lawmakers sought to express when dividing the
penalization of slavery into two separate offenses in order to capture and
punish, as such, the fact of imposing a “condition” on a person. Through
what the Rapporteur termed as a “condition,” stating that subjecting
someone to it was, in itself, criminal,162 might be ultimately denoted this
very feature of slavery: the overall control exercised by an offender over
all aspects of a person’s life. Indeed, several authors have concluded that
“[c]ontrol will almost certainly be a factual pre-requisite for any de facto
exercise of the powers attaching to ownership. A person can only be sold,
lent, used or discarded if first she is within the realm of control of the
seller, user, lender or discarder.”163 Therefore, control could be understood as the “core” of slavery, which is to be prohibited “independently of
any other activity to which the person concerned is unwillingly
subjected.”164
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ironically, while French lawmakers intently addressed the very causes
of the two violations handed down by the ECtHR against France, closely
adhered to the main definitional indications given by the Court through
161.
Beaussonie, supra note 112, at 869.
162.
Alain Richard, compte-rendu intégral des débats, Sénat, séance du 27 mai 2013
[Full Report of the Debates, Senate, Sitting of May 27, 2013], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 4773, https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201305/s20130527/s20130527.pdf.
163.
Hickey, supra note 143, at 239; see also Allain & Hickey, supra note 154, at 491,
495, and Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, supra note 70, at guidelines 2–3.
164.
Pluen, supra note102, at 41.
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relevant cases, and this bearing explicitly in mind the concern of the legislation’s efficiency requested by the ECtHR,165 the penal statute that has
been passed contains several structural flaws, which directly impact its effectiveness and are likely to hinder its implementation to various degrees.
Notably, despite provisions couched in terms that seemingly pertain to objective situations, the domestic definitions of forced labor, servitude and
slavery ultimately fail to allow judges, law enforcement bodies and potential offenders to clearly recognize which factual exploitative behaviors
each notion refers to. This is all the more detrimental in that these concepts not only conveyed a strong symbolic connotation, but are also intrinsically linked, in the collective unconscious, to a historical past that is
poorly understood and most often reduced to the erroneous image of permanently unchained and highly mistreated persons.
However, the benefits of this worthwhile endeavor are not to be underestimated. By striving to tailor the existing human rights definitional
standards to the shape of penal offenses in a civil law system, French authorities’ work reveals some significant issues that had not emerged
throughout the reflection carried out at the European level on the occasion of the very few modern-day cases determinated to date. In the context of a legal area that is still, in many ways, under construction,166 this is
certainly the French statute’s greatest credit, as it has thereby fully contributed to the dialogue established between member states and the Strasbourg Court towards an optimum enforcement of human rights’ standards.
It appears in particular that the application of the gradation model to Article 4 is a significant source of confusion in defining the three types of
human exploitation prohibited by the ECHR. The difference in character
that opposes forced labor on the one hand to servitude and slavery on the
other hand appears to make such a model unfit for determining the applicability of the provision, in that it contradicts the assumption on which the
model relies that all slavery encompasses servitude and all servitude encompasses forced labor. Similarly, the premise initially brought out at the
European level, that servitude involves a condition that does not equate
the powers attaching to the right of ownership that slavery postulates,167
shall be discarded. Indeed, it stemmed from both factual circumstances
submitted and ECtHR’s evaluations that, by referring to a “condition,”
servitude, like slavery, rather implies the existence of a control tantamount
to possession exercised over an individual: both concepts, therefore, involve a foundational incident of ownership. This seems to be precisely
what intrinsically distinguishes them from forced labor, the latter pertaining to a control confined to elements of coercion. The very features that
define servitude as opposed to slavery, which would help draw a clear dis165.

Richard, supra note 107, at 7709.

166.
See also the Austrian criminal framework in J. & Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶¶
41–50 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring).
167.
114.

See Malinverni, supra note 39; Siliadin, supra note 16; Ergec & Velu, supra note
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tinction between these two forms of severe exploitation, remain to be figured out.
In that respect, the French authorities’ stance to promptly conclude to
a compliance of recent French penal provisions with European requirements is of great concern, as it presages a similar enduring reluctance as to
the one encountered over the last decade to objectively question the quality and efficiency of the relevant statute in order to make any appropriate
amendments and adjustments.

